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Summary 
 
 
In order to understand the nature of the emerging ethnic movements among the Iranian 
Azerbaijanis, scholars have taken different perspectives;  ranging from viewing  the issue as 
an inevitable and natural consequence of deprivation to a result of external political influences.   
However, a critical review of the literature would reveal the existence of several gaps in 
the majority of these researches. For one thing, many of such researches fall short in providing 
sociological insights and reliable ethnographic evidence for what they claim. In fact, political 
and historical perspectives dominate the literature. Moreover, the majority of them approach 
"Iranian Azeris" as a homogenous group having similar demands and same strategies to achieve 
these demands, which appear to be non-accurate with reference to generational differences, city 
versus rural and geographical location, etc. 
This thesis is an attempt to take a small step in understanding ethnic identity construction 
process among Tabrizi youth, which in turn can contribute to understanding the nature, root 
causes and body of ethnic movements in this city. Yet the main distinction of this thesis from 
the previous work may lie in its focus on how everyday micro level “interactions” of actors 
“construct” their identity and distinguish them from "others."  
For doing so, I have taken a qualitative approach which benefits ethnographic fieldwork, 
participant observation and interview as its main tool. A total number of 59 Tabrizi youth and 
15 experts participated in the interviews. The questions investigated the ethnic boundary 
features and the self-perception of identity among Tabrizi youths. The fieldwork for this 
research has been done in 4 months. 
The major findings reveals that the social stigma of the language and accent plays an  
important role in Iranian Azeris dissatisfaction and resentment than perceived political or 
economic discrimination by the government. Tabrizi culture, accent and customs are considered 
as “standard” and “indigenous” for the Tabrizi residents. Therefore, a middle-class Tabrizi who 
speaks with that accent usually owns a satisfactory amount of symbolic capital. Therefore, he 
is not much attracted to other identity alternatives of Persian’s, Republic of Azerbaijan’s or 
Turkey’s. For non-Tabrizi Azeris residents of Tabriz city, on the other hand, the issue is more 
complicated. They are the leaders of ethnic identity movement in Tabriz. We have explained 
this phenomenon through discrimination and stigmatization imposed upon them in their 
everyday lives inside Tabriz city. 
In conclusion, the thesis states that the ethnic right movement, which started as a civic 
middle-class movement inspired by universal human right discourse, seems to have gone far 
from its primary goal while gaining greater visibility. This visibility is mostly due to the 
emergence of an exclusive, non-modern radical movement led by non-Tabrizi Azeri residents 
of Tabriz concentrated in several poor neighborhoods.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
While empires drew their territorial boundaries across ethnic lines, modern nation-
states tend to impose the territorial integrity of the state on people of different ethnic 
groups within their borders. Thus, policymakers seek to understand how ethnic identity 
is formed and maintained.  Some states have been successful in the critical task of 
integrating minorities into the nation state while others have failed. In areas with a long 
history of tribal, sectarian and ethnic conflicts, this issue becomes more relevant.  
Today, the Middle East has turned into a center of severe ethnic conflicts. The 
question of Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, the internal ethnic conflict in Afghanistan, and the 
ongoing Azerbaijani-Armenian ethnic conflict are just some examples of them. Out of 
the ruins of the Ottoman, Russian and Persian empires in the region, Iran is the only 
country that has survived fragmentation from ethnic conflicts. However, the emerging 
ethnic rights demands among its many ethnic groups might be a sign of change. 
Iranian Azerbaijanis are the largest minority group in Iran. While there is no 
official consensus on their population, some sources estimate that they comprise about 
16-24 percent of Iran's population (CIA fact sheet 2015). They mainly live in the 
northwestern provinces of Iran (see Figure 1) and speak Azerbaijani language, a dialect 
close to Anatolian Turkish. Their practice of Shia Islam firmly ties them to the Shia 
majority in Iran. Historically, Azerbaijanis have played active roles in the cultural, 
political and economic development of the Persian Empire, as well as in contemporary 
Iran (Patricia 1988). Although they are commonly pictured as a loyal minority throughout 
the history of Iran (Grebennikov 2013), their identity has taken various forms, from an 
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Iranian with a strong sense of national identity, to an Azerbaijani (or Iranian Azerbaijani), 
a Turkic oriented ethnic group, a Shia Muslim community, and sometimes with all these 
distinguishing lines blurred. This has often caused confusion in trying defining their 
ethnic boundary. 
 
Figure 1. Ethnic composition in the northwest of Iran and neighboring countries. 
 
(Source: World Language Mapping System 2011) 
 
During the last two decades, ethnic-based cultural and political movements have 
increased in the Azerbaijan of Iran (Safizadeh, 2013). Ethnic awareness is becoming more 
into consideration in people’s everyday life practices. Though many researchers would 
agree that currently there is no perceived fear of secession in the Azerbaijan of Iran (e.g., 
Grebennikov 2013, Ahmadi 2008), the abrupt rise of civic demands like linguistic rights 
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and a firm stand against the social, historical stigma of being termed as "Turk” in Iran are 
signs of some change among them.  
 The current situation differs from one city to another, depending on their 
geographical location, political salience, cultural differences with the neighboring ethnic 
groups and many other factors. This research focuses on the city of Tabriz, as it is the 
biggest and the most homogenous Azerbaijani ethnic city in Iran. While couple of decades 
ago, many young middle-class families preferred to talk in Persian with their children, 
nowadays the trend has changed completely. Many young families prefer to choose 
Azerbaijani name for their children and send them to Azeri dance classes. To track the 
roots and consequences of these changes in Tabriz city, this study focuses on the 
perceived ethnic identity among the youth, considering the generational gap difference in 
post-revolutionary Iran. 
Many scholars took different approaches in studying the dynamics of change 
among Azeris in Iran, from the relative deprivation theory (Saleh, 2013) to the external 
political influences (Souleymanov, 2012). However, due to the lack of anthropologic 
fieldwork, these analyses seem to be opinionated of the Tabriz city Azerbaijanis.  
In oreder to specify the internal factors on youth’s everyday life in Tabriz City, 
the following major questions were raised:  
- What factors influence the ethnic awareness of Tabrizi youths?  
- How do different in-group characteristics influence youths of their subjective 
view of ethnic identity? 
- What are the dynamics of ethnic rights’ movements among Tabrizi youth? 
- Why have the ethnic rights movements gained popularity among the youth in 
certain neighborhoods? 
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Trying to investigate these questions, this research have taken a qualitative 
approach, which benefits ethnographic fieldwork, participant observation and in-depth 
interviews as it, main tool. Two sections of fieldworks has been done first during February 
and March and second on August and September 2016.  The total number of 59 Tabrizi 
youth and 15 experts participated in the interviews. The questions aimed to explore the 
ethnic boundary features and the self-perception of identity among Tabrizi youths.  
After this introduction, the second chapter provides a general background of 
Iranian Azerbaijanis. After a brief demography of study area, a historical overview of 
Azerbaijanis from 1823 until today briefly covered. The emergence and roots of ethnic 
activism is Azerbaijan has been discussed in the next section. Finally the existing 
literature on Iranian Azerbaijanis presented.  
The third chapter reviews the theoretical framework. To find answers to the 
questions, this research has taken two theoretical approaches: first, Fredrik Barth’s (1996) 
tradition of studying ethnic boundaries (groups in relation with “others”) rather than the 
group itself, and Wimmer’s (2013) multilevel process theory of ethnic boundary making. 
Tabrizi youth’s perception of their identity in their relation to Persians, Turks of Turkey 
and “other” Azerbaijanis across the border is discussed. Second, the significant role of 
linguistic stigma in defining ethnic identity and boundary among them is discussed. The 
research places special emphasis on “language” and “accent” because it is considered as 
the major part of the sense of “stigma” or “esteem” among them. 
Chapter Five is on the research methodology. First, the importance of the 
ethnographic method in ethnic identity research is clarified to justify the tools used in this 
research. Then the challenges in doing participant observation are explained in detail.  
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In Chapter six, observations in the field and the data analysis from the interviews 
are presented. This chapter is divided into four parts. First part is the perception of Tabrizi 
youth about their identity, language and folklore in interaction with others. This part starts 
with the controversial concept of authentic Tabrizi and the feeling of status difference 
that it causes. The role of social, economic and symbolic capital of individuals in 
influencing their choices towards ethnic boundary building is presented.  The second 
part investigates the vital role that language and accent play in people’s ethnic identity 
construction mechanism. The third part, addresses the existing ethnic right movements in 
Tabriz city and the factors that contribute to shaping the movements. The focus of the last 
part is on Chehelmetri neighborhood as an important site for shaping radical movements 
and the motivations of ethnic activists from this neighborhood. 
Chapter Seven presents the concluding remarks. Linking the observations with the 
theories and the literature review, this section argues that in the lack of perceived 
economic discrimination against Azeris in Iran, the youths’ deal with the stigma of the 
language itself or their accent rather than other forms of discrimination. This perceived 
linguistic stigma is not only rooted on being mocked by other ethnic groups, but also is 
rooted on Azeris self-view of their language.  
It is concluded that the ethnic right movement that started as a middle-class civic 
rights movement was inspired by universal human right discourse, but seems to have gone 
far from its primary goal while gaining greater visibility. This visibility is mostly due to 
the emergence of exclusive movements led by non-Tabrizi residents of Tabriz 
concentrated in several poorer neighborhoods. It seems that these groups try to define 
Iranian Azerbaijani identity merely through Azeri language and folklore and through 
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confrontation with others (Persians). Middle-class Tabrizis tend to be distanced from this 
movement.  
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2. General Background 
 
Iranian Azerbaijan has gone through different historical experiences. The 
primordial approach may provide an explanation of the vital role of ethnic awareness 
among different ethnic groups in present Iran. The origin of Azerbaijanis, their role in the 
contemporary history of Iran, their relations with the Northern Azerbaijanis and the 
question of Turkic identity are some of the heated debates among Iranian Azerbaijanis.  
This chapter presents a brief history of Iranian Azerbaijanis from the division of 
Azerbaijanis between Russia and Iran until the establishment of the post-Soviet 
Azerbaijan and Turkey’s increasing cultural attraction on Iranian Azerbaijanis. Rapid 
social and political changes, especially in the recent years, caused a wide inter-
generational gap in perceiving ethnic identity. 
 
2.1.    Demography of the study area 
Historical Persia, as with all empires, has had varying borders. Contemporary Iran 
is a multi-ethnic country as well. Major ethnic groups in contemporary Iran are 
Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchs, and Turkmans. The country has been successful in 
the process of nation-state building, despite ethnic conflicts. At the same time, the 
political territory of modern Iran has remained unchanged since 1828. This long-lasting 
political stability is the main argument of the majority of the citizens including ethnic 
minorities to respect their “Iranian” nationality regardless of their ethnicity (Ahmadi, 
2008).  
Iranian Azerbaijanis comprise the largest population of ethnic Azerbaijanis in the 
world. They generally live in four provinces of East and West Azerbaijan, Ardabil and 
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Zanjan with many in nearby provinces of Qazvin, Hamadan, and Markazi. Moreover, 
during the contemporary period, many of them have migrated to other provinces of Iran, 
especially to the capital, Tehran, Karaj and Qom for economic and political reasons. 
The focus area for this study is Tabriz city. The city of Tabriz with the population 
of 1.8 million (Iran’s Statistical Center, 2011), the capital of the East Azerbaijan Province, 
is the most important historical city for all Azerbaijanis (Figure 2). Economy-wise, the 
city, is the most developed city in the northwest of Iran and one of the main industrial 
centers of the country. Historically, the city has always played a significant role both in 
the country and the Azeri-resident regions. For a long time,  middle and higher class 
citizens of Tabriz have tried to show their pride of being Azeri by maintaining their ethnic 
identity through preserving Azeri folklore and speaking in their language in daily 
conversations. Ethnically, Tabriz is almost a Azeri dominant city, and it is rare to hear 
someone speak in Persian even among government officers even though the official and 
written language is Farsi. Despite being developed, there has been almost no migration 
by other ethnic groups to Tabriz.  
 
Figure 2. Geographical map East Azerbaijan province and Tabriz city, North West of Iran. 
Source: “Institiute of Iranian Ethnic Studies” 
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2.2.    Historical Overview 
Azerbaijan was divided between Russian and Persian Empires in 1828. The 
northern part was joined to the Soviet Union, and the latter became an independent nation 
of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Swietochowski, 1995).  Azerbaijanis along the border 
have experienced two different political systems and distinct processes of nation-state 
building and institutional order for almost two centuries. This has highly affected their 
cultural, religious and nationalistic sentiments (Khalili, 2016; Aliyeva, 2013). 
Being under the governance of the Soviet Union for more than seventy years, 
residents of the Republic of Azerbaijan have been strongly influenced by socialist 
ideology, while Iranian Azerbaijanis have been under the influence of Persian culture, 
literature, and politics.  
Reza Shah-e Pahlavi (1925 - 1941) took an inclusive attitude towards all ethnic 
groups in general, and Azeris in particular, in order to modernize the country by 
centralizing political power and assimilating all ethnic groups into the Persian culture 
(Atabaki, 1993: 53-61). This led to the severe internal suppression which lasted for 
several years, together with the interest of the Soviet Union to expand its political 
penetration in post-World War II Iran. This resulted in the establishment of an 
autonomous, independent Azerbaijan from 1945 to 1946 in the Northwest of Iran. For the 
first and only time in Iranian Azerbaijani history, Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) 
changed the official and educational language of the region to Azerbaijani and promoted 
their ethnic rights (Hasanli, 2006). By the beginning of the Cold War and the ending of 
the Red Army’s support, the young Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1979) gained control 
of the independent territories. After that, until the Islamic revolution of 1979, ethnic 
demands of all minorities in Iran was disregarded aiming to build a homogenous national 
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identity focusing on the glorious past of the Persian Empire. Today, many Azeri ethnic 
activists bring the case of ADP, as an example of successful local governance for ethnic 
rights, while non-activists do not know that much about it. 
Since the Islamic revolution, the new regime has used the religious notion of “Shia 
Muslim” as a new form of maintaining the country’s national unity. Moreover, during the 
eight years of Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Iranian government presented the war as a 
religious one. At the same time, they promoted Iran’s territory as a sacred land for all 
citizens regardless of the ethnic group they belonged to (Ebrahimi, 2012). Moreover, in 
the bipolar atmosphere of the post-World War II period, demands of the political 
opposition in the country were associated more with socialist ideologies rather than ethnic 
rights. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, an independent country of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan was established in the North. Massive number of Azerbaijanis 
started to cross the so-called iron curtain after 70 years of separation. Some scholars 
(Shafeer, 2002) anticipated that the ties between co-ethnics would get stronger gradually 
(Shafeer 2002). However, research shows that different processes of nation-state building 
in two countries made distinct perceptions of ethnic identity across the borders (Khalili, 
2016). 
By the beginning of the 21st century, especially after Turkey speeded up the 
process of modernization, it became the center of attention for many Iranian Azerbaijanis. 
Rising number of the tourists and students who pursue their studies in Turkey increased 
the attention of Iranian Azerbaijanis towards Turkey as a successful model of integrating 
Islam and modernity in the Middle East. However, current political instability and 
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terroristic attacks in Turkey has slowed the increasing pro-Turkish sentiments among 
Azeris and enhanced the complexity of the situation. 
 
2.3.    The emergence and roots of ethnic activism 
The clash between ethnic and national identity have always been the main 
motivation behind any political activism in Iranian Azerbaijan. Being conservative Shi’a 
Muslims (compared to other parts of the country) and having their education in the 
Persian language, the majority of Iranian Azerbaijanis define their dominant identity as 
Iranian. However, during the last two decades, ethnic-based cultural and political 
movements have increased dramatically in the Azerbaijan of Iran (Safizadeh, 2013). Even 
though many field researchers would agree that currently there is no perceived fear of 
secessionism in the Azerbaijan of Iran, a sudden rise in the civic demands like linguistic 
rights and economic equality are signs of change taking place in the region.  
When the reformist party came to power under the presidency of Mohammad 
Khatami (1997-2005) in Iran, alongside with relative political freedom and civil society 
promotion policies, many local magazines started to be published in Azerbaijani 
language. However, even this limited political pluralism didn't last long, and many of the 
publications got suspended, and in some cases, the journalists got arrested. Some ethnic 
activists started to openly ask their right to educate in Azerbaijani. This right has been 
explicitly mentioned in Article 15 of the Iranian Constitution but never practiced. Many 
ethnic activists and secessionist groups started to rise in the region. In 2006, the Azeri 
ethnic issues became highlighted more than ever and turned into an internal security issue 
when a governmental Persian newspaper printed an insulting caricature of a cockroach 
speaking in Azerbaijani. Azeris took offense. Many thousands of them rioted in the streets 
12 
 
of Azeri dominant cities of Tabriz, Orumiyeh, Ardabil, Zanjan and even in the capital 
Tehran, claiming their rights and asking for an apology. Their main demand was to stop 
social, cultural and economic discrimination against Azeris. The riots were severely 
suppressed by the central government (Souleimanov, Pikal, and Kraus, 2013). 
Some scholars interpret these emerging movements solely from the political 
viewpoint and link these changes to the establishment of the Post-Soviet Republic of 
Azerbaijan and its political penetration. Some politicians in Iran claim that it is the result 
of Turkey’s policy of spreading pan-Turkism ideology in the region as well as the West’s 
recent policy to destabilize the internal security of Iran. However, ethnic activist groups 
inside Iran, in response, deny receiving any kind of support from foreign sources claiming 
that it is an entirely independent movement and accusing the state of using this strategy 
to neglect the minorities’ inalienable ethnic rights. Another group of scholars sees the rise 
of ethnic demands in the Azerbaijan of Iran in-line with the hegemony of human rights 
discourse in the global political sphere that has led many communities and groups to seek 
for their rights. Atabaki (2015), has recently added a new dimension to this debate by 
putting his emphasis on the role of individual elites (e.g.Professor Mohammad Taghi 
Zehtabi). In Atabaki’s view, Zehtabi has significantly contributed to the rise of such 
demands by publishing his famous book: “The ancient history of Iranian Turks” in which 
he recalls iconic historical figures like “Babak” to bring back the pride of being Azeri. 
 
2.4.    Review of the literature on Azerbaijani ethnic identity 
To have a clear understanding of the ethnic identity perception among Iranian 
Azerbaijanis, first, we need to explore the current debates and political views over the 
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origins of ethnic identity. Then, the centrality of ethnic or national identity among them 
should be carefully investigated.  
The quest for ethnic identity among Azeris in Iran starts with the controversy of 
ethnic origin, and continues with the demand for language rights and opposing existing 
social and economic discriminations. “Whether or not Azerbaijani people are originally 
Turks” has been the subject of debate for a long time. In his book, “Azeri or the language 
of the Ancient Persia,” Kasravi (1946) states that Azerbaijanis are not a distinct ethnic 
group from Persians. On the other hand, several other ethnic activists and scholars oppose 
this view. The dilemma of whether Iranian Azerbaijanis are “Turks” (as they are being 
called as Turks in Iran), “Azeris” (as Kasravi stated), or “Azerbaijani” is an important 
question that is being discussed in many daily conversations of ordinary people. While 
many ordinary citizens are confused in using these terms, ethnic activists or others who 
are more aware of ethnic rights are very concerned about how they are being termed as 
Azeris or Turks by Persians. 
There is the variety of ideas on how to deal with the ethnic diversity in Iran among 
different scholars. Some researchers, taking a primordial point of view, mention about 
the glorious, conflict-free era of the Persian Empire. They argue that all these ethnic-
based conflicts in Iran are very recent phenomena, emerging just after the First World 
War (Ahmadi, 2008; Ashraf, 1994). They intend to prove that the different ethnic groups 
had lived together peacefully during the Persian Empire for centuries. The Persian 
language was the official language of a vast geographical area situated in current Iran and 
the neighboring countries even during the reign of the Azeri origin dynasties like Safavids 
(1502-1736) and Qajars (1785-1925). In their point of view, ethnic rights activism in Iran 
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has little public support and is supported by neighboring countries and super powers in 
order to destabilize the country (Ahmadi, 2008). 
Nevertheless, Azerbaijani ethnic activists, as well as some other historians, 
believe that above-mentioned interpretations are a result of their Pan-Iranist tendency. 
They consider that throughout Iranian history, whenever the central government was 
weakened, rebellious movements started to grow among ethnic minorities. However, the 
process of modernization in Iran went forward by suppressing all the ethnic minorities 
during Reza Shah’s era (1925 - 1941) (Taqilu, 2016).  Therefore, they argue that ethnic 
issues are a central problem in Iran, which rises repeatedly despite suppression whenever 
the country experiences political instability.  
As Jalayipour (2014) explains, there are three different types of nationalism in 
Iran. The first category identifies with the glorious era of the Persian Empire. The second 
category started with the Islamic Revolution in Iran when the government promoted 
religious nationalism. In this type, the focus is based on being Shi’ite Muslim. Ethnic 
differences are kept subdued in the first and second type. The last type is civic nationalism 
which is based on pluralism and tolerance and opposed to any discrimination between 
different ethnic groups. Jalayipour believes that this type has never been practiced in Iran 
and is the only one which could work well for the multicultural case of Iran. 
Few anthropological researches have been done on the ethnic identity question of 
Iranian Azerbaijanis. Surprisingly the results of these researches sometimes are 
paradoxical and completely contradict each other. For instance, while Souleimanov 
(2013), based on his fieldwork in Tabriz on September 2010, mentions that: “there is 
almost open talk in Tabriz about the need for federalization in Iran and the establishment 
of Azerbaijani autonomy”.  Safizadeh’s (2013) fieldwork, in a stark contrast, reveals 
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that Tabrizis are very loyal to the integrity of Iran. Lack of anthropological approaches to 
everyday life might have its roots in the political restrictions of doing fieldwork on 
sensitive issues for the government in Iran. Additionally, as Fakouhi (2010) states, 
sociological researches in Iran follow macro-level analyses. Thus, few indigenous 
researches conduct fieldworks in everyday life of the ordinary citizens. 
Reviewed works of literature seem to fall short in addressing the differences 
between different Azeri residing cities of Iran, generational gaps and differences among 
the distinct social classes in the society. Therefore, in order to take a small step in this 
direction, this research focuses solely on Tabriz city and the young generation.  Future 
work can be expanded to the study of different generations in different Azeri residing 
cities of Iran. 
Religious and political territorial ties with Iran, linguistic and ethnic ties with the 
Republic of Azerbaijan and the sense of looking for a modern and westernized Turkish 
culture has added to the complexities of Iranian Azerbaijanis ethnic identity. In the 
politically unstable Middle East, ethnicity has always been one of the main reasons for 
the conflicts and wars and the collapse of the great empires and states. Deteriorating 
situation of the Kurdish ethnic issue in the region has added more fuel to the fire and has 
further encouraged the Iranian Azerbaijanis to demand their ethnic rights as well. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
Fieldwork for this thesis revealed that many factors engage on Tabrizi youth’s 
ethnic awareness. In order to benefit the existing literature for our discussion, this chapter 
provides a brief explanation of some of the influential works in this field. While 
understanding the nature of ethnicity and its dynamics have always been of interest to 
social scientists, there has been little consensus about what its nature is, how should it be 
understood and what its effects are. On the other hand, doing research on ethnic groups 
has a long history in the discipline of anthropology which has contributed to the evolution 
of ethnic theories. In return, recent revolutionary ethnic theories suggested by some 
scholars - e.g. comparative and constructivist-based study of ethnicity by Barth (1996) - 
have proposed new approaches to ethnographic fieldworks (Cohen, 1978). In this regard, 
theorists usually have been divided into three groups: advocates of instrumentalism 
theories, primordialism, and constructivistism approach (Hale, 2004).   
 
3.1. Ethnic identity theories 
3.1.1. Instrumental approach to ethnicity 
 According to Instrumental approach, individuals choose between various 
identities according to self-interest. Instrumental approach sees ethnicity as a strategic 
basis for coalitions that seek a larger share of economic or political power (Mayoral & 
Ray, 2012). The instrumentalist approach is not limited to the economic or political 
aspects; instead, it can be symbolic. For example, when someone gains satisfaction from 
efforts to keep traditional elements of a threatened culture or when ethnicity is redefined 
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and reshaped in one's search for self-realization of identity (Blanton, 2015). Therefore, 
from this perspective, ethnicity can be created as people's historical memory and used by 
leaders in pursuit of their political interests (Wan & Vanderwerf, 2009).  
This approach is visible among many Azerbaijanis on different occasions, when 
some try to conceal their origin, ethnicity or even nationality. For instance, traveling to 
Turkey, they try to highlight their Turkic origin while in Tehran, many would prefer to 
put the emphasis on national identity. This applies to their other inter-ethnic relations and 
in certain circumstances to their intra-ethnic relations as well. Many individuals would 
prefer to maximize their benefit by switching between identities. 
 
3.1.2. Primordialist approach to ethnicity 
Primordialist approach perceives ethnic membership as given or acquired through 
birth. Each person belongs to one ethnic group, and that group membership remains fixed 
over a lifetime, which later will be inherited by the next generation (Chandra, 2012). It 
can also be described as having emotional attachments to "the gross actualities of blood, 
race, language, locality religion, or tradition" (Blanton, 2015). These days, primordialism  
is perceived to lack theoretical sophistication. They argue that ethnic groups are 
objectively primordial and therefore eternally permanent but are usually accused of 
‘naturalizing’ ethnicity (Gil-White, 1999). 
Some radical Azerbaijani ethnic movements pursue a primordial approach to their 
ethnic identities; however, the majority of the middle-class youths in Tabriz does not 
perceive their ethnic group as chosen. They usually have a critical view against 
primordialists.  
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3.1.3. Constructivist approach to ethnicity 
The constructivist approach to the ethnicity is a response to the insufficiency of 
the other above-mentioned views. It claims that ethnicity is constructed through a process 
of collaboration between ethnic groups. Therefore, ethnicity is the product of a social 
process, not a cultural given (Bayar, 2009). Fredrik Barth is the pioneer of constructivism 
approach to ethnicity (Wimmer, 2008). In general, constructivist assumptions have 
dominated studies of ethnic identity formation and change (Chandra, 2012).  
According to Nagel (1999), identity and culture are building blocks of ethnicity, 
and these two are constructed, dynamic and constantly evolving to shape individual 
identity and group organization. In this process, both structure and agency play important 
roles. While Ethnicity is the product of a sum of actions of ethnic group members, it is 
also constructed by external social, economic, and political factors (Nagel, 1999). 
Some (Hale, 2004), find these categories unhelpful and call for producing "micro-
level" explanations for why and how people tend to think and act concerning "macro-
level" identity. Wimmers, on the other hand, attempts to go beyond these debates by 
arguing that the empirical and analytical questions that they raise cannot be solved by 
trying to find out what ethnicity "really is." Instead, he argues, the focus should be put on 
understanding why ethnicity appears in such variable forms (Wimmer, 2008). 
Constructivism theory is  
 
3.1.4. Barth's theory of ethnic boundary and Wimmer’s criticisms 
Fredrik Barth (1996) stand against the dominant primordial approach which gives 
the importance to the cultural, territorial and biological differences. Instead, he asserted 
that the ethnicity is not given but constructed through interaction with others. Therefore, 
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he suggested that instead of the ethnographic study of each ethnic group separately, we 
should ”... shift the focus of the investigation from internal constitution and history of 
separate groups to ethnic boundaries and boundary maintenance"  (Barth, 1996: 11). In 
the following decades, numerous case studies in which they could fit -or contradict- 
Barth's constructivist theory have been done among different ethnic groups worldwide.  
Inspiring by the Barth’s theory, some of the interview questions for this thesis 
were conducted based on asking the perception of interviewees about their neighboring 
groups. Depending on their life experiences and daily interactions, different questions had 
been asked, like their relationships with the neighboring ethnic groups, with their co-
ethnics across the border, and their in-group relations with "other" residents of the city 
who have different geographical origin. 
Opposing the Barth's approach, Andreas Wimmer (2013) in his multilevel 
boundary making theory, argued that primordialist and constructivist theories failed to 
explain why characteristics of identity vary dramatically across cases because their 
perception of ethnicity was "as such." His theory, which is considered to have the 
potential of becoming a classic in the ethnic studies field by many scholars (i.e., Lamont, 
2014), instead, took a more flexible approach. He states that the notion of boundary 
making is constructed through having different degrees of political salience, social 
closure, cultural differentiation and historical stability. What he suggests is a complicated 
multilevel process to illustrate how these characteristics are generated and transformed 
over time as an outcome of the struggles and negotiations between actors situated in a 
social field. He asserts that "Three characteristics of a field—the institutional order, 
distribution of power, and political networks— determine which actors will adopt which 
20 
 
strategy of ethnic boundary making" (Wimmer, 2008: 971). Next section explains 
Wimmer’s critic to the current approaches in details. 
 
3.1.5. Wimmer’s model of ethnic boundary making 
While the finding of this thesis shows that the complexity of ethnic boundary 
among the Tabrizi youth cannot be solely explained by the Barth’s constructivist’s view, 
Wimmer’s theory, which is based on the interaction of macro and micro level factors, 
could better explain the existing situation. 
Wimmer's theory is an ambitious theory which claims to propose a comparative 
analytical framework for explaining ethnic boundary making, redefining and diminishing, 
not only in one specific region as the majority of other research in the field do but in any 
given region (Song, 2014). Findings in ethnographic field work showed a large gap 
between the dominant middle-class Tabrizi youth and a particular suburb neighborhood 
named Chehelmetri. Wimmer’s theory could shed light on our understanding of the 
emergency, roots, and consequences of radical movements among Azerbaijanis.   
According to this theory, individuals and groups construct ethnic boundaries in 
different ways, depending on a combination of external (exogenous) and internal 
(endogenous) processes (Patsiurko & Wallace, 2014). Moreover, the model includes 
macro-structural level as well as the individual agency level in the analyzing process. 
Through an extensive review of the existing empirical research on ethnic boundary field, 
Wimmer aims to answer the question of “why the process of ethnic group formation 
produces varying outcomes?” (Wimmer, 2008). 
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Through an extensive review of the existing empirical research on ethnicity 
boundary field, Wimmer aims to answer the question "why the process of ethnic group 
formation produces varying outcomes?" (Wimmer, 2008). 
The model has been explained in three steps. The first step is identifying all main 
dimensions or strategies that cause the varying outcomes. The second step is devoted to 
the macro-level analysis where three characteristics of social fields that explain which 
actors will pursue which strategies are introduced. The third step, at the individual agency 
level, discusses the consensus reach as a result of political struggles between actors 
advocating different ethnic categories. This consensus will, in turn, explain the 
characteristics of ethnic boundaries (Getting back to the structural level). 
 
First Step: 
Wimmer identifies four principal dimensions of variation for any ethnic group: 
different degrees of political salience, ethnic boundaries, social closure and exclusion 
along ethnic lines, cultural differentiation between groups, and of stability over time. In 
the following I will briefly explain each of these dimensions: 
Political salience of ethnic boundaries:               
“When boundaries are salient, political alliances are more likely to be formed 
between co-ethnics than between individuals on opposite sides of a boundary.” At the 
same time, varying degrees of political salience exist. He gives us two examples: in 
Switzerland, no political party or civil society organization is organized on the basis of 
the language, while in Northern Ireland politics is mostly a matter of ethnoreligious power 
relations. 
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Social Closure and "Groupness." 
It explains which ethnic boundaries are relevant for the structure of social 
networks and the access to resources that they enable. Some ethnic groups have closed 
themselves off to outsiders, while some others do not matter for hiring, marrying, 
befriending, etc. Depending on the degree of closure, ethnic boundaries may or may not 
separate groups with widely shared agreements, but if the boundaries are drawn 
unambiguously, they can form the basis for collective action and resource mobilization. 
Cultural Differentiation 
For Wimmer, cultural differentiation may or may not play a major role in ethnic 
boundary making. Cultural differentiation may make a boundary appear quasi-natural and 
self-evident, but in other cases, ethnic boundaries may unite individuals who follow 
heterogeneous cultures. 
Stability 
Some groups and boundaries are tenacious and change gradually over generations, 
while in other cases, considerable change may occur during a lifespan of an individual.  
To continue with making a record of various possible strategies of ethnic boundary 
he also points out the elementary strategies: shifting boundaries through expansion of the 
category, shifting the boundaries through contraction, inversion, repositioning and 
blurring boundaries (Wimmer, 2008). 
Second Step: 
At the second step, he defines main factors (constraints) that shape the dynamics 
of ethnic boundary making among the actors of a social field. These factors which 
represent the macro-level analysis of this model are: 
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The institutional framework: determines which types of boundaries (ethnic, social 
class, gender, etc) can be meaningfully drawn in a particular social field. The important 
example is: how the modern nation-state building process had led people to distinguish 
between "us" and "them" rather than between "men" and "woman," "rich" and "poor," 
etc. 
The distribution of power: defines the interests according to which actors in a 
social field choose the level of ethnic differentiation. Actors tend to choose that level of 
ethnic distinction that best support their claims to prestige, moral worth, and political 
power. Political alliances that determine who exactly is included in actor's ethnic category 
or other words, the precise location of the boundary. 
 
Third Step: 
In this step, interactions among actors of boundary making are analyzed. These 
interactions may or may not lead to a consensus over the social topography and meaning 
of ethnic boundaries. The consensus is reached when institutional structures, power 
differences, and networks of alliance create a zone of mutually beneficial exchange 
between actors. 
Next, the nature of the consensus needs to be analyzed. This finally leads to 
introducing mechanisms that either stabilize or change a system of ethnic boundaries: 
The structure of a social field may change because of an exogenous shift (new 
institutions, resources, actors), an endogenous shift (consequences of strategies pursued) 
or because of an exogenous drift (new strategies diffuse and are adopted by certain actors) 
(Menzo, 2012). 
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The nation state, according to Wimmer, provides the most common institutional 
context for establishing ethnic boundaries, and while institutions and networks determine 
how salient ethnic divisions are, the power inequalities and the extent of political 
consensus determines the nature of the boundaries that emerge. For Wimmer, the internal 
factors of boundary construction are first and foremost associated with the institutions of 
the nation-state and with the political interaction of ethnic groups. 
Wimmer’s framework applies to the finding of this research in a great deal.  
However, in defining the role of institutional influences, his emphasis on the nation-state 
with networks and political power as the center of “internal institutional impact”, may not 
be very accurate in the case of Tabrizi youths’ boundary shifting. Instead, other internal 
influences such as neighboring ethnic groups, self and common perceptions of ethnic 
identity, the influence of social stigma and the role of the civil society may play an 
increasing role among them. In other words, ethnic communities themselves seem to be 
evolving as much as state institutions are. Therefore, in an analysis of the shifting ethnic 
boundaries in the case of Iranian Azerbaijanis, it makes sense to focus on internal 
influences such as the neighboring groups, spread of the discourse of rights, the role of 
political elites, as much as on external factors such as the dynamics of change in the 
region.  
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Figure 3. The multilevel process theory of Wimmer 
 
Source: (Wimmer, 2008: 1009) 
 
3.2. Theories related to language and accent stigma 
After finishing the first round of fieldwork for this thesis, I realized that one of the 
main factors, which play a role in shaping group and ethnic boundaries for Tabrizi youths, 
is the language accent. Its role differs in different daily interactions depending on the 
social circumstances. In the absence of the racial differences between Azerbaijanis and 
Persians, the only way to distinguish the ethnic or geographical origin is the language 
accent. Depending on the situation, some took this variation as a social stigma while for 
others it is a sort of esteem. 
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As it explained in the previous part, Wimmer’s theory in explaining the micro- 
level interactions pays little attention to the interpersonal factors in the everyday life of 
the social actors. Here, I placed particular emphasis on "language" and "accent" because, 
first, many scholars perceive language as the very foundation of every culture. Secondly, 
we have to deal with our spoken language and accent all the time in our communications 
with others so the consequences can’t be determined  (DeShields & Kara, 2011). Thirdly, 
Azeri language and accent have caused a significant part of the sense of stigmatization 
among Azerbaijanis of Iran. Linguistic demands and stigma are perceived to play a more 
important yet symbolic role compared to economic, cultural or other social aspects in 
defining the ethnic features and boundaries among young Azeri residents of Tabriz city. 
We shall benefit this theme at two different levels: inter-ethnic and inter-ethnic. 
Intra-ethnic level is about Azeri ethnic Tabrizi youth in contact with other neighboring 
ethnic groups (non-Azeris), while intra-ethnic level deals with the interactions between 
Azeri-ethnic people who are originally from Tabriz city (speaking with Tabrizi accent) 
and other Azeri-ethnic residents of Tabriz (speaking with other Azeri accent usually 
belong to smaller cities and towns). 
To understand "the stigma of non-native accents," first we should have a 
sociological understanding of stigma itself. The classic definition of stigma has given by 
Goffman (1963). According to him, stigma refers to an attribute of a person that is deeply 
discrediting, which reduces that person from a usual person to a discounted one in other's 
minds and leaves a devalued social identity in that particular context (Goffman, 1963). 
Link & Phelan (2001) conceptualize stigma from a sociological perspective. According 
to them, the stigma exists when several inter-related conditions exist: people label 
differences, dominant culture stereotypes and negatively label undesirable differences, 
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some degree of separation between “us” and “them” happens. Labeled people experience 
discrimination and status loss, and finally, the stigmatization can harm the stigmatized 
person's access to power and social and economic resources (Link & Phelan, 2001). They 
hoped that this multi-step definition would facilitate the understanding of all different 
kinds of social stigma.  
Now by having a general understand of social stigma, we could move towards 
linguistic stigma, which is observable among the youth in Tabriz city in their daily life. 
 
3.2.1. Stigma of non-native accent 
Accent stigma seems to fit into the above-mentioned definition. As an example, 
Rubin (1992) explored how the undergraduate students negatively judged their non-native 
English speaking teacher assistants even when they spoke the language completely 
standard. (Rubin, 1992). 
Researchers have studied the stigma of non-native accent in people’s everyday 
life communications from different perspectives. Some have focused more on the 
perception of the listener, while others put more stress on the speaker (of the non-native 
language). Studies, which focus on the listener mainly, analyzed the accent stigma as 
embedded in the prejudice framework and investigated about the existence of 
stereotyping, discrimination and cultural biases. (Mills, 2015). However, the number of 
research which have focused on the speaker and how experiencing the sense of stigma 
affects his perception of the self, identity, isolation and group membership and the 
consequences of these effects, are limited (Gluszek & Dovidio 2010, Mills, 2015, 
Derwing 2003).  
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Edward (1999) discusses the "standard accent" within a country. This accent 
usually has a symbolic value, is more desirable and prestigious and is perceived to be 
spoken by the educated or upper classes in the society. 
This perspective, first, would help us in analyzing the position of Iranian 
Azerbaijanis in their inter-ethnic relation interacting with native Persian speakers. In this 
occasion, our emphasis will only be on the listener. Second, we will focus on residents of 
Tabriz who are originally from small towns and talking in Azerbaijani having a non-
Tabrizi accent. In this regard, our focus is both on the speaker and the listener since their 
relationship is a focus point of this thesis. It will be argued that how the sense of feeling 
stigmatized, especially linguistically, leads many non-Tabrizis to join ethnic activism 
movements and strange response to need for social esteem. Next section explains Gluszek 
and Dovidio’s (2010) model, which focuses both on the speaker and listener stigma. 
 
3.2.2. Gluszek and Dovidio’s Model of Stigma of Non-native Accents in 
Communication (SNAC)  
This model emphasizes the special importance of both empirical and theoretical 
dimensions of identifying accent as a stigmatizing characteristic. This significant is due 
to the rapid increase of interactions between native and non-native speakers in the 
globalization age. Nevertheless, the model is not limited to the interactions between the 
migrants from foreign countries with the native people; instead, it includes the regional 
and ethnic languages and accents within the borders of one country. 
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Figure 4. Model of stigma of non-native accents in communication  
 
Source: (Gluszek and Dovidio, 2010: 56) 
 
The other advantage of SNAC to be applied in this thesis is its two-way approach 
to the communication of native and non-native actors since it takes into account the 
psychological processes relevant to accents that affect both the speaker and listener as 
well as their interactions. By doing so, it offers insight into the processes behind 
intergroup contact (Gluszek and Dovidio, 2010). 
Figure (4) elaborates that how different communicative, social and contextual 
factors affect both speaker and listener. It shows that online processes of the evaluation 
and communication strategies affect both counterparts. These interactions would be 
repeated in everyday interactions among the native and non-native speakers. Both parts 
need to reach to a sort of subjective satisfaction in every interaction in order to maximize 
their social esteem. By bringing out many examples of previous research, SNAC proposes 
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a better understanding of the consequences of this stigmatization on both sides, especially 
the speaker, in defining their strategies for the future interactions. 
 This part is inspired us to think about how this process influences Tabrizi and 
stigmatized non-Tabrizi residents of Tabriz to lead them for redefining their perceived 
ethnic identity and boundaries.   
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4. Research Methodology 
 
This chapter starts with justifying the use of ethnographic fieldwork in studying 
the ethnic identity construction of the Tabrizi youth. Then the importance of the studied 
fields has been clarified in detail. The chapter finishes by explaining the interview 
procedures and participant’s information.  
 
4.1. Ethnographic research 
This research has a qualitative approach using ethnographic fieldwork as its main 
tool to investigate the ethnic boundary features and the self-perception of identity among 
Tabrizi youths. Ethnographic fieldwork digs into people’s everyday lives to reveal many 
aspects of their social and cultural behavior, which are the collective sum of their simple 
actions. Therefore, actors may not be conscious about how the everyday routine activities 
make up social action. However, the aim of ethnographic research is not to simplify the 
complexity of the social world but to yield objective macro level hypotheses through 
unique subjective micro-level routines. In depth interviews, narratives and participant 
observations which help us to deepen this understanding (Bloommaert and Dong, 2010). 
Furthermore, conducting ethnographic research is especially important when it 
comes to the ethnic studies. Anthropologists are the main contributors to the field of 
ethnicity (Cohen, 1978). This is mostly due to the debated nature of this concept that 
encourage the scholars to closely and thoroughly analyze it. These debates are shaped 
mostly around: the never-ending disputes over the definition of ethnicity and what it is 
consist of (Nagel 1994, Isajiw, 1979, Obidinski, 1978  to name a few), variation of the 
32 
 
outcomes from case to case (Wimmer, 2008), and popularity of constructive approach to 
ethnicity. 
 
4.2. Participant observation 
4.2.1. Fieldwork schedule 
The fieldwork for this research was done over 4 months once in the February and 
March and again on the August and September 2016. Even though the time between two 
ethnographic fieldworks was only couple of months, many terroristic attacks made 
Turkey’s internal security unstable and abruptly decreased the number of Iranian tourists. 
I tried to track and compare any potential change on people’s perception of having Turkic 
origin versus belonging to Iranian national identity between these periods. 
 
4.2.2. Choosing the fields 
Many different places had been chosen to observe the daily contact of Tabrizi 
youth with other ethnic groups or with others from different Azeri cities.  
In Tabriz city, Laleh-park Shopping mall, as the first modern Turkish branding 
shopping center in Iran, had been chosen to investigate. Since the architecture of the mall, 
most of the brands, coffee shops and restaurants are Turkish branches, it is important to 
consider the role of identity claiming by using Turkish commodities. Laleh-park is the 
place where they find the same branches with exactly same products in Tabriz and 
Istanbul; therefore, some would feel that they are strolling in the Turkish society. 
Moreover, some Persians from other cities frequently make a shopping tour to this place 
since the Turkish textile are famous as being cheap and high quality. Therefore, 
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interaction between two ethnic groups observed almost everyday afternoon during doing 
the fieldwork. 
The Tabriz-based Tractor-Sazi football club has earned massive support of ethnic 
Azerbaijanis across Iran, breaking all nationwide attendance records. Many thousands of 
Azerbaijani fans accompany the Tractor-Sazi football team to its matches. During the 
four months of fieldwork, the researcher participated in all Tractor-sazi matches with 
Persian teams. Many of the spectators find games very important since the team is the 
advocate of their ethnic rights. 
Moreover, some other cultural and linguistic related classes and meeting had been 
attended. Some examples of these places are as follows: Azerbaijani language classes in 
the university of Tabriz (as an optional credit for students), some home gathering of 
cultural and ethnic activists, traditional Khorshid café where is famous to be the gathering 
place for ethnic rights activists and some meetings of the student association of research 
on Azerbaijan in the university of Tabriz. 
To understand the ethnic boundary making strategies of Tabrizi youth, this 
research did not confine the focus only on the current residents of Tabriz, but also some 
other Tabrizis who were living in Turkey or in the Republic of Azerbaijan had 
interviewed. In short, visits to Istanbul and Baku, I interviewed some Tabrizi students 
who live there. To understand everyday interactions, I used Tabriz-Baku and Tabriz-
Istanbul buses which gives an opportunity to have long discussions with passengers about 
ethnic otherness. In Tehran, besides interviewing with some Azeri ethnic scholars, I tried 
to observe the everyday interactions of Azeri youth who speak Persian with accent. 
After finishing the first round of fieldwork, the results showed that the youth from 
certain neighborhoods perceive their ethnic identity quite different than others. To test 
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this hypothesis, the suburb neighborhoods of Chehelmetri and Heydarabad were selected 
to do participant observation.  
 
4.2.3. Challenges in ethnographic fieldwork 
The tradition of anthropological researche in Iran is rarely practiced among many 
social scientists as elsewhere (Fakuhi, 2010). Shahsavani (2010:128), a distinguished 
anthropologist in Iran, states that “the centrality of anthropology has not yet been born. 
Good theoretical work grows in academia when there is professional security”. She 
maintains that in this politicized circumstances of the country it is needed to start a new 
trend.  Bulookbashi accuses Iranian researchers for not having 'taken advantage of their 
superior familiarity with local folklore to emphasize an indigenous autonomy similar to 
that stated by other Asian, African or American cultures' (Bulookbashi, 2010:34).  
As an indigenous researcher who speaks Azerbaijani language with Tabrizi 
accent, the author of this research had an advantage of having enough knowledge about 
the field and using his social network to create trust among interviewees. However, some 
obstacles made it difficult to investigate the everyday life of people. 
Post-revolutionary Iran (1979- ), is highly politicized and the government has little 
patience to hear the voices of opposition parties. In this situation, the rise of secessionist 
groups in Iranian Azerbaijan made the situation even worse. Even though this research 
aimed to focus on people’s perception rather than having political approach, many locals 
found it a sensitive issue to talk about. That is why convincing interviewees to talk about 
their perception, especially among some ethnic activists, was difficult and needed 
patience and the strong trust ties. The author, sometimes, was accused by some 
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interviewees and even cultural experts to be belonging to Iran’s or another foreign 
countries’ intelligence service, intentionally or unintentionally.   
Considering this situation, in everyday contexts, sometimes the researcher did not 
introduce himself as a student overseas, but as a local curious person. However, 
considering the ethical framework of the research, all interviewees were well informed 
about the status of the researcher and the academic objectives of research. 
Another obstacle for the research was the difficulty of studying gender differences 
in ethnic identity. As a young male researcher, the author faced several difficulties in 
finding the young girls to interview because of the cultural barriers. This issue was more 
considered in Chehelmetri neighborhood. Only one girl who was an ethnic activist family 
interviewed in suburb regions. This only one case cannot be the advocate of many silent 
voices of half of the population of research focus group. 
 
4.3. Interview  
4.3.1. Interview guidelines 
All interviews were chosen based on having at least three years of recent 
experience of living in Tabriz, whether the participants were born in Tabriz or not. Since 
the in-depth interviews were semi-structured, the guidelines were adapted to the different 
groups of the participant. The interviews with the youth were different from that of 
experts. First, the interview guideline with the youth participant will be discussed. Then 
the interviews with experts are presented.  
The guidelines contained the following topics: the use of language in everyday 
life, cultural leisure activities, ethnic identity and ethnic otherness, and political views on 
Azeri ethnicity. These topics were chosen by care in their order. To decrease the 
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sensitivity of the research focus, most of the interviewees were told as being interviewed 
about their general life style. Interviews started with some general information on 
participant’s family background, places they were born and lived and their family 
background. The prevalence of inter-ethnic marriage in their family circle was asked. 
Then their cultural, linguistic and folkloric practices were asked to reveal how important 
it is to practice them in Azeri, Persian, or Turkish. The usage of language in their everyday 
life, relationships, writing SMS’s, etc. was asked. The questions about language usage 
were started by general questions like “how do you feel if you have a Persian speaker 
boy/girl friend?”. In this way, respondents may explain more in details about the status, 
usage and their attitudes on the language usage in an implicit way. Other questions like 
their interest in learning the writing system of Azeri language were asked to elicit this 
information. Finally, the role of having accent in speaking Persian or Azeri in their social 
relations was asked. As an Instance, they were asked: 
- How do they feel when they travel to Tehran? 
- How will they react if they were being mocked by some other ethnic groups 
because of the lack of ability in talking Persian fluently?   
- Which Azeri accent should be considered as the base for formal writing language? 
- What is the Tabrizi people’s perception of non-Tabrizi accent? 
 The second theme was to ask about their cultural and leisure activities. The 
questions in this theme were asked to understand whether their cultural and leisure 
activities were ethnically organized. For instance, they were asked:  
- What kind of poems do they usually read?  
- Which sorts of music do they prefer (Azeri, Persian, Turkish)? and why?  
- What kind of dance do they like to perform? 
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The third theme was ethnic identity. This theme started with asking some general 
questions to make it easy for informants with the topic. Then more personalized questions 
were asked. Some of the questions are as follows: 
- How would you identify yourself, given a choice to introduce between an Iranian 
or Azerbaijani? 
- What differentiates Azeris from the other ethnic groups?  
- How is your perception about your co-ethnics in the republic of Azerbaijan? 
- Which of Turkic, Azeri or Iranian identity is superior for you? 
 
The questions to investigate the last theme, which is their political view, varied 
according to the participant’s background in engaging ethnic based activities. The direct 
questions of their political view about their ethnic rights were avoided; instead, they were 
asked indirect questions like if they feel any sort of discrimination against Turks in the 
country. Their opinion about some ethnic riots in Azeri cities in response to some 
insulting programs in public TV channels was asked. Their support for Tractr-sazi team 
and its importance as the symbol of Azeri ethnic rights demands were discussed. Finally,  
they were asked to suggest a way to overcome the ethnic based conflicts. In some cases, 
direct questions like how do they think about possibility of secessionism or to engaging 
actively in the ethnic rights movements were asked. 
The interview guidelines with the experts consisted of following parts: language, 
social stigma and ethnic identity and boundaries. Expert interviews, in contrast with the 
youth, hardly dealt with the personal questions. Instead, the questions focused on the 
historical background and scientific literature and theories. Again, the guideline started 
with the language and social stigma issue to put the interviewees in the ease. The usage 
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of the Azerbaijani language –as a spoken language- was discussed with them in details. 
Having an accent as a social stigma in two different levels were discussed: inter-ethnic 
stigma (Azeris talking in Persian) and intra-ethnic stigma (Talking in non-Tabrizi accent). 
Social status of the Azeri’s in the puzzle of multi-ethnic Iran were brought into light. The 
questions were based on the theories of the stigmatization caused by accent on the 
perceived social identity of Iranian Azerbaijanis.   
In the theme of ethnic identity and boundaries, questions were connected to the 
Wimmer’s four dimensions of ethnic group features: political salience of the Azerbaijanis 
in the context of national unity of Iran, their cultural differences with the neighboring 
ethnic groups, their social, economic, symbolic role in the Iranian and regional context 
and the historical stability of the region were discussed in details. The interview questions 
were all connected to the main research questions. 
 
4.3.2. Respondents 
The total number of 59 youth and 15 experts participated in the interviews. 
Appendix 1and 2 show some useful information about the participants.  
In table 1, Special focus was put on the interviewees’ origin and their accent in 
talking Azerbaijani. As it is shown on the Table 1, they were chosen from various 
backgrounds, life experiences and social status. The youth participant’s mean age was 
27.9 (SD:4.9, range 20-35: 46 males, 13 females).  Snowball sampling used to choose 
the interviewees.  
The first round of fieldwork was more focused on interviews and the second round 
on participant observation and expert interviews.  Thus, the total of 56 interviews (52 
with the youth and 4 with the experts in Tabriz and Baku) during the February and March, 
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2016, and the total of 18 interviews (7 with the youth and 11 with the experts in Tabriz 
and Tehran) in the second round, between the August and September, 2016, were 
conducted. In some cases, the participants discussed the interview questions in the group 
of 2 to 5 people. Those interviews are highlighted in the tables. All the names here have 
been changed in order to preserve the personal information of the participants.  
Any interview conducted out of Tabriz city has been mentioned in the comments. 
Other comments, which make the interviewee distinct from the others, are mentioned in 
the comments. 
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5. Discussion on the Findings 
 
In order to best determine and present the main factors influencing ethnic 
boundary dynamics among Tabrizi youths, this chapter has been divided into two parts to 
discuss intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic effects. For the Tabrizi people, ethnic “others” are 
defined as: Persians, Turks of Turkey, and Azerbaijanis across the border. While the self-
perception of the youths has been subject to gradual change in line with the social and 
political changes regarding each of the mentioned ethnic groups, the influences are hard 
to trace, as the city is quite homogenous. The next section of this chapter deals with the 
intra-ethnic interactions within Tabriz. Findings show that the accent one speaks is the 
main indicator to identify him as an indigenous Tabrizi or a migrant from the suburban 
parts, and this can play a significant role in choosing the path of whether to join or to stay 
reluctant or opposed to the ethnic movements. The chapter ends by focusing on the role 
of the suburban neighborhood of “Chehelmetri”, as a famous residential area in 
promoting the ethnic activism in Tabriz. 
 
5.1. Ethnic boundary construction through inter-ethnic relations 
Who the Iranian Azerbaijanis are, and how they should be called or recognized by 
others are highly controversial issues. I asked the question of “what is your ethnicity?” 
from all of my interviewees. Surprisingly the answers vary from Turk, Azeri, Azeri Turk, 
Iranian Azeri, Iranian Azerbaijani and sometimes Iranian Azerbaijani Turk. While these 
answers may not be fundamentally different from each other, the way every individual 
perceives these terms can be completely different. This section has considered Tabrizi 
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youths’ ethnic identity as constructed through their direct or indirect contacts with other 
ethnic groups in their neighborhood: Persians, Turks, and Azeris across the border. 
As discussed before, if primordialism sees ethnic and national identity as natural, 
fixed, homogenous and inevitable, constructionism perceives ethnic and national 
identities as contingent, heterogeneous, and subject to change, as the product of human 
interaction, history, and politics (Hall 1990). 
Having cultural similarities with Iran, ethnic similarities to the Azeris in the 
Republic of Azerbaijan and the their ethnic origin in Turkey, Iranian Azerbaijanis enjoy 
the opportunity to alternate between any of these identities. From another perspective, it 
seems that the individuals  move between these identities to maximize their personal 
benefits much more than inheriting a  primordial identity. 
 
5.1.1. Perceived inferiority or superiority towards Persians 
If an Iranian Azerbaijani travels to non-Azeri dominant cities of Iran, he has to 
deal with different reactions to his Azeri accent when speaking in Persian. It appears as 
if Persians need to take a certain stance toward Azerbaijani-speaking people. The most 
common reaction would be asking which Azerbaijani city one is from or to use some 
metaphors in a sarcastic way to express their view of “how dumb or intelligent” 
Azerbaijani people are. It seemed that everyone needs to react somehow “differently” 
when they met Azerbaijanis.  Most of the time, they would start a conversation by saying 
how good, hospitable, and intelligent Azerbaijani people are. Yet, after feeling more 
intimate, they may make a sarcastic comment about Azerbaijani people or in extreme 
cases, one would relate a stupid act to them being Turkish (Azerbaijani). 
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The official language of the entire institutional and educational system of the 
country is Persian for all including Azerbaijanis. While all educated Azeri youth are fluent 
in the Persian language, their daily communication skills may not be fully advanced since 
they communicate mostly in Azerbaijani. Moreover, they can never fully overcome the 
accent problem even if they  speak Persian perfectly.  In many cases, even among the 
highly educated youth, they face some situations of being mocked because of their accent 
or inability to use a correct Farsi expression. Such experiences cause them to lose 
confidence when facing Persians and increases the feelings of inferiority among them. 
There is a famous expression among Tabrizis saying that there are three different 
categories of people in Iran: anyone who speaks in their accent is Tabrizi, anyone with a 
non-Tabrizi accent is a rural person and all the Persian speakers regardless of where they 
come from are prestigious Tehranis.”This saying indicates the existence of a perceived 
inferiority among many Tabrizis when facing Persians. 
 “Majid”, a businessman, believes that if one’s cell phone or car number reveals 
that he is from Tehran, he will enjoy a higher social status in everyday life contacts and 
especially in doing business in Tabriz. One might say that since Tehran is the capital and 
the biggest and most prestigious city of the country, this sense of inferiority is not limited 
to Azeris. However, this sense of inferiority among Azeries is not merely towards Tehrani 
people but it is more like attributing a high social status to all Persian speakers. However, 
having this perception is highly dependent on one’s experience of living with or being in 
close contact with Tehranis. For instance, interviewee “Nima,” who lived in Tehran for 
few years, says that Tehranis should not be seen as one whole. “Depending on the 
neighborhood people live in, their culture, social status and lifestyle can vary extremely. 
Life condition in Tabriz is much better than many neighborhoods of Tehran”.  
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In another sense, asking the interviewees about their perceptions of an ideal 
partner, many girls expressed that they would like to have Persian boyfriend rather than 
a Tabrizi or one from neighboring Azeri cities. For many of them, Persians seem to be 
more open-minded than Azerbaijanis. Interviewee “Sevada” believes that Persian guys 
know much better how to treat a lady. Many boys also consider Persian girls as more open 
to relationships and open minded as well. 
During my fieldwork I realized it is fairly common for Azeri girls to choose to 
speak in Persian in their friendship circles. While many of them speak in Azerbaijani with 
their families, it seems that choosing Persian in social interactions brings them a higher 
social status. However, many were reluctant to attribute a specific meaning to it during 
interviews. Interviewee “Sahar,” said that languages are only tools for communication. 
So she doesn't care which language she is using. Yet, it is not common among the males 
to talk in Persian unless they have to. In some gatherings, I observed that it is common to 
see that girls communicating in Persian while boys answer them in Azerbaijani. 
Besides all mentioned above, there is an increasing tendency among Azeris, 
especially among the ethnic activists, to stand against such presumptions by taking the 
opposite side. For instance, Hassan, a former political prisoner who regularly holds part-
time jobs in Tehran denies the superiority of Tehranis: 
“ … Who are Tehranis? There was no city named Tehran a few hundred 
years ago. The whole city is shaped by the migrants, and the biggest group 
of migrants are Turks. Living in Tehran is like being at home for me … We 
[Azeris] built Tehran … we comprise half of the population of Tehran ...” 
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The existence of such paradoxical perceptions towards Persians makes it 
difficult for individuals to take a neutral stance towards the ethnic differences. 
Thus the ethnic lines are gradually striking in the region.  
The influence of schooling institutions is one of the most critical issues 
shaping self-perception of Iranian Azerbaijanis. All the youth interviewees were 
asked about how they would perceive Persian as the educational language 
instead of Azeri. Many of them complained about unfamiliarity with Azeri 
literature due to their inability to read in Azerbaijani. However, many of them, 
even some of the ethnic rights advocates, believed that Persian literature is far 
richer than Azerbaijani or even Turkish and Arabic literature. They emphasized 
the importance of the Azerbaijani language only in the spoken and folkloric 
level. While Azerbaijani dance style for the youth meets their need to feel 
socially distinctive from the Persians, they usually read Persian poems and listen 
to the traditional Persian music. Interviewee “Hamed” states that: 
“I only listen to the nostalgic Azeri songs, since the new songs are all 
copied from Turkish style … Even the old songs are not as rich in content 
comparing to Persian ones. We have Hafiz, Khayyam, Rumi in Persian … 
who is the famous poet of Azerbaijanis?” 
 
While expert interviewees, except some ethnic activists, agreed on a view that 
Azerbaijani is a local spoken language non-comparable with Persian, scholars in Baku 
who were interviewed showed a strong disagreement to the inferiority of Azerbaijani 
language. Interviewee “Shokat,” a historian in Baku state university, asserted that 
Azerbaijan has great Poets, many of whom are from Tabriz. It was shocking for her to 
hear that some Tabrizi youth prefer Persian literature to Azerbaijani.  
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Such comparisons might not have a scientific basis. However, the important issue 
here is whether the reason Iranian Azerbaijanis undermine their own language and 
literature has its roots in the influence of Persianization of the educational and social 
institutions, or it is based on the existence of influential Persian classical literature figures.  
 
5.1.2. “Us” vs. “them”: Azerbaijanis across the border 
The question of their co-ethnics became more important for Iranian Azerbaijanis 
especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The opening of borders was a critical 
point in the history of Azerbaijan for both Northern and Southern Azerbaijanis. There is 
little anthropological literature explaining the events of the first years after the borders 
opened. Shafeer (2002) describes the removal of the iron curtain in an emotional way 
when Azeris crossed the borders to meet their relatives after 70 years of imposed 
separation. In her book, “Iran and the challenges of Azerbaijani Identity,” she asserts that 
family ties had played a crucial role in maintaining the ethnic identity among both Soviet 
and Iranian Azerbaijanis. However, her work has been criticized by several indigenous 
scholars due to the absence of anthropological field research (Atabaki, 2004).  
Despite Shaffer’s prediction, family ties are no longer a determining factor. The 
recent policy of “entering to Iran without Visa” for the citizens of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, hasn't received much interest from the Iranian Azerbaijanis and hasn't led to 
enhancing their emotional ties with their co-ethnics on the other side of the border 
(Khalili, 2016). 
Respondent “Leila,” was among the first group of cultural experts who traveled 
to Baku just after the establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan. She, as well as other 
senior expert interviewees, assert that when they faced with the reality of post-Soviet 
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Azerbaijan, she was shocked. She explains that they were so happy to travel to their 
beloved communist land after several years of being separated. However, when they came 
back from the trip, they were all disappointed that their dreams about a utopia of an equal 
and free society has failed. Interviewee “Mahmood” talks about how difficult it was for 
him to visit post-Soviet Baku. He regretfully says that it was extremely hard for him to 
see how one could easily sleep with beautiful girls by offering only an inexpensive pair 
of Jeans or a fish can. Although the youth, as the target group of this research, did not 
witness those days, it seems that the historical memory of the older generation has been 
transmitted to the younger generation in the shape of a very pessimistic view towards 
their co-ethnics in the Republic of Azerbaijan.  
Such pessimism also exists among the Azerbaijanis across the border judging their 
co-ethnics in Iran. In the first instance, many of them would see Iranian Azerbaijanis as 
Iranians, inhering dominant Iranian culture, rather than their indigenous culture. When I 
attended a wedding ceremony in Nakhchivan city of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the DJ 
played a “Persian song” for me as their “dearest Iranian guest” and asked me to perform 
a “Persian dance” for them. It was surprising to me that they expect an Azerbaijani to 
perform Persian dance and not the Azerbaijani. One could easily observe that even though 
citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan call Iranian Azerbaijanis as their brothers and 
sisters, many still believe that Iranian Azerbaijanis are Iranians who belong to the Persian 
culture more than Azerbaijani. 
Recently, there have been many contacts between two Azerbaijanis. Since 2008, 
the Iranian government does not require visa from citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan; 
so many Azerbaijani people are traveling to various Azerbaijani cities in Iran, especially 
to Tabriz, mostly seeking for medical care. Nowadays if one goes to any hospital or 
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famous clinic in Tabriz, they will most probably find few travelers from the Republic of 
Azerbaijan. Since there are not sufficient health services and good doctors in the Republic 
of Azerbaijan, and the cost of treatment is higher in their home country than in Iran, they 
prefer to travel to Tabriz to find good doctors who speak their language and to access 
inexpensive and high-quality surgery or medication. The main interaction of these two 
groups usually happens in the hospitals and doctors waiting room. Although the treatment 
cost for Azerbaijanis is officially set by the municipality at twice the usual fee of Iranians, 
some doctors charge foreign patients even up to five times more than Iranian nationals. 
That's why they treat foreign patients better and sometimes out of the waiting line. This 
fact could be heard from anyone who had faced northern Azerbaijanis in medical care 
centers.  
Interviewee Shahram states that: 
“While they are traveling to Iran even to cure a very small disease, we 
could imagine how underdeveloped their country is … when we do not have 
enough facilities for our own Iranians, why should our government let them 
come … I see from their behavior and even dressing that their culture lags 
behind ours...” 
 
In home decoration, fashion and clothes, and wearing of makeup, the majority of 
Iranian Azerbaijani women think that people in the Republic of Azerbaijan are lagging 
behind the modern world. They rarely follow the media of North Azerbaijan unless for 
some nostalgic films or songs, since they consider them as socially unfashionable and 
outdated, while those in the Republic of Azerbaijani have the same conception about 
Iranian Azerbaijanis. I had some discussions with the young generation from Baku who 
judge Iran as a barbaric country ruled by Islamic clergies. They think that Iranians have 
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no freedom, but their own country is secular and is a much better place to live compared 
to Iran. 
Jamil Hassanli, a well-known historian, and an opposition politician describe this 
phenomenon as the signs of failure of the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He 
asserts that: 
“While our media fails to produce attractive programs, how we could 
expect Iranian Azerbaijanis to connect to us? When they travel to 
Azerbaijan, they might be charged 100 manats [Azerbaijan Currency] for 
bribery from the border to Baku, how we could expect them to advocate 
Azerbaijan? … They have their economic interest in Tehran; many had inter-
ethnic marriages. This fact linked them to Persians more than to their co-
ethnics. “ 
 
A significant feature that distinguishes Iranian Azerbaijanis from those of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan is their paradoxical attitude towards Armenians. Following the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia, from the 
late 1980s to 1994 the citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan assume Armenians as their 
sworn enemy, who committed atrocities in Karabakh city. However, Iranian Azerbaijanis 
never considered that war as their own, and have hosted a quite big Armenian diaspora 
living in peace for a long time in the city of Tabriz. Many of my young Iranian 
interviewees had never even heard about the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, even though 
the conflicted area is geographically close to them. Interviewee “Arzu,” who is an 
advocate of Azerbaijani culture and attends the weekly meeting of some Turkic cultural 
activists said that she has heard about the place (Nagorno-Karabakh) in some Azeri songs 
but does not know where the area is located and what the conflict is about. Few 
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interviewees knew about it, and even if they had heard about it, they did not have much 
sympathy for the Azerbaijan displaced persons from the Nagorno-Karabakh area.  
The results of two different processes of the nation-state building in Iran and the 
Republic of Azerbaijan could be obviously observed today among the people, specifically 
the youth.  The majority of interviewees and other Tabrizi persons, I communicated with 
in daily felt that visiting Azerbaijan was not a priority. I didn’t observe strong ethnic 
based sentiments among the majority of youth in linking their identity to their co-ethnics 
across the border. For many youths who were interviewed, national identity was far 
significant to the ethnic identity. 
Political and historical changes have always played an important role in promoting 
one identity over another. In the case of Azerbaijan, just after the economic boom took 
place on 2006 by utilization of BTC pipeline, the urban structure in Baku developed 
dramatically. It was the time that Iranians Azeris were praising their co-ethnic nation. 
However, since 2012, the oil price went down and made many problems to the oil 
economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Their currency has devalued to more than half in 
recent years. Same people who wanted to attach themselves to the Republic of Azerbaijan 
saying that the country is fast developing because of the Western-style management, later 
changed to criticizing the oil-based economy.  
Alongside with all these political changes, it seems that many youths will try to 
switch between these identities to maximize their benefit.  
 
5.1.3.     The question of Turkic origin 
There is a heating debate among Persian and Iranian Azerbaijani elites on how 
Iranian Azerbaijanis should be called. However, Persians and Azerbaijanis themselves 
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commonly use the term “Turks” to refer to Iranian Azerbaijanis (pronounced as Tork in 
Persian). It has been a subject of debate for a long time whether or not Azerbaijani people, 
in Iran or the Republic of Azerbaijan, are originally Turks. The term “Azeri” is not 
considered as correct by some academic scholars, but it is commonly used by Iranians in 
informal conversations (Kasravi, 1946). Recently, especially after Turkey sped up the 
process of modernizing the country, while Iran and Azerbaijan are still lagging behind, 
Azerbaijani people in both the Republic of Azerbaijan and in all the widespread diaspora 
tend to consider themselves of “Turkish ethnicity.” Some historical debates suggest that 
all Turks including Turkish people, Azerbaijanis, Turkmens and even some ethnic groups 
in eastern China used to belong to a larger nation that was once called “Turkistan.” 
Promoting pan-Turkism ideology, they are searching for a way to prove that they 
originally belonged to the same ethnicity. However, since Iran and the Republic of 
Azerbaijan were not under the Ottoman Empire for a long time, this left a gap between 
them and the Turks living in contemporary Turkey. In current demography, the most 
Eastern parts of Turkey is dominated by the Kurdish ethnicity which is far different from 
Azerbaijanis. This fact has resulted in a situation where Iranians and Azerbaijanis find 
themselves completely different culturally and linguistically from the residents of the area 
across the Turkish border. This may be due to the vast geographical area, occupied by 
Kurds, between Azerbaijanis and Turkish people belonging to Turkey (See Figure 1 in 
the introduction). 
Interviewee “Arzu,” who sojourns to Ankara says that many Turkish citizens even 
do not know if there is an Azerbaijani population living in Iran. She asserts:  
“It is easy for us to learn and speak in their dialect … because we follow 
Turkish media. Everyone in Tabriz watches Turkish TV series, while for 
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them it is difficult to understand us. For example, my father could understand 
them, but they could not understand him. “ 
 
Many other interviewees who lived in or traveled to Turkey several times assert 
that Turkish citizens only consider themselves as the highest status Turks by looking 
down at others. While some of them resist against this prejudices, others see it as natural 
and the result of being so-called non-original Turk. How to deal with their origin 
sometimes turns to be a critical question for many Iranian Azerbaijanis. Being called 
Turks in Iran and by themselves while being rejected as of not being indigenous Turks of 
Turkey creates confusion among them. 
Interviewee “Majid” explains his experience as: 
“ I believe that the original Turks are Turks of Turkey … because they 
speak the right language … we are not indigenous Turks … Turkish people 
do not consider us as belonging to the same ethnic group, but they call us 
Azeri … we are close to the Azeris across the border, not the Turks of 
Turkey.” 
 
By the beginning of the 21st century, satellite TV among Iranian Azerbaijanis 
became common despite its illegal status according to the Iranian law. Turks have been 
pioneers in spreading their cultural and political influence in the region through 
broadcasting interesting and entertaining programs with which the reserved, boring 
Iranian public media cannot compete. Therefore, as the language similarity makes it fairly 
easy for Azeris of Iran to master the Turkish language within a few months, the Iranian 
Azerbaijanis follow the Turkish media widely. 
On the other hand, Turkey hosts the largest Iranian diaspora many of whom have 
Azeri origins. Until 2012 Azeri students from Iran had an advantage of enjoying 70 
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percent tuition reduction scholarship for those who could pass an interview to 
demonstrate their Azerbaijani language ability. Many Tabrizi youth found studying in 
Turkey cheaper than in a private university in Iran. Moreover, as a foreign student, they 
were not obliged to take an entrance examination. Therefore, many Tabrizi middle-class 
families sent their children to Turkey and started to visit Turkey regularly.  
From the tourism perspective, until the most recent years, Turkey was one of the 
most famous touristic destinations for many Iranians, especially Azerbaijanis. In this 
regard, visiting or living in Turkey might be considered as one of the few ways through 
which Iranians, as citizens of a politically closed country to the West, could join the 
globalization trend.  
One could easily observe the gradual increase in the usage of Turkish words in 
daily conversations of the middle-class Tabrizis. Many middle-class Tabrizi youths who 
have traveled to Turkey or learned language through media, consider the usage of Turkish 
words in daily conversations as a form of symbolic capital. However, others who are not 
familiar with these words do not feel comfortable to hear “foreign words.” Interviewee 
Ali expresses that: “Our language has already mixed enough with Farsi … we should not 
let the Turkish words to enter to our literature... It will ruin our tradition. ” 
To observe the influence of Turkish culture and commodities, I chose Laleh Park 
shopping center as one of the main research sites. Established on 2013 in Tabriz city, 
Laleh Park is the biggest and only Turkish brands shopping center in Iran. The whole 
center has been built by Turkish construction companies exactly in the same architecture 
of Turkish shopping centers. The place is considered as a small scale Turkey in Tabriz by 
many Tabrizis. In many occasions, I saw that shopkeepers were switching between 
Persian, Azerbaijani and Turkish continuously, especially dealing with their female 
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customers. They told that this is a way of attracting middle-class youths to the Turkish 
commodities.  
Though, for many years, Iranian Azeris looked up to the Turkey’s economic and 
cultural advancement, the recent rapid change in the political sphere in the Middle East 
has changed Turkey’s ideal image for them. While doing the first round of fieldwork for 
this research in February and March 2016, the internal security of Turkey was not affected 
much by terroristic attacks.  At the start of my second fieldwork, the situation changed 
dramatically. Many bomb attacks happened in different regions of Turkey, and the lack 
of security in the country gradually changed Iranian Azerbaijanis’ perception in praising 
Turkey’s advancement. I reached to the interviewees once again during the second 
fieldwork and traced the changes regarding their attachment to the proud of having a 
Turkic origin. In many cases, praising Turkey’s integrating Islam with democracy was 
replaced by disappointment from the unstable political situation there. For many, who 
had believed Turkey as the best model for the Middle Eastern countries to follow, it was 
difficult to see the fade of their hopes to follow the Turkish model of modernity in Iran. 
 
5.1.4. Discussion 
The finding of this thesis showed us that there is some common belief towards 
other neighbor groups among the Tabrizi youths. Even though some individuals or ethnic 
activist stand against the dominant perspective, their resistance is taking a form of social 
resistance against the attitude of their own people, more than to be with other ethnic 
groups. While the majority of Iranian Azeri youths consider Iranian identity above all 
other alternatives, they are enjoying the commonalities with neighboring groups to 
maximize their interest rather than alternating the identities. As Wimmer (2008) argues 
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on the influence of institutions on ethnic groups, Iranian Azerbaijanis seldom question 
their national identity and unity in front of others. This is in contrast to the opinion of 
some other scholars (e.g. Cornoll, 2015) who put emphasis on the external penetration of 
the neighboring states.   
Bringing the focus back into the everyday life, in the homogeneous Azeri 
dominant city of Tabriz, the residents have little chance to face neighboring ethnic groups 
directly. Yet, they experience the language influence of other ethnic groups in their daily 
life. While using the Persian language and Turkish words are considered as belonging to 
the prestigious middle class, the use of accent and words close to the northern 
Azerbaijanis could be seen as belonging to the lower classes or radical movements.  
 
5.2.  Ethnic boundary shifting through intra-ethnic daily interactions  
This section provides an overview to the main issues that affect Tabrizi youths’ 
self-perception of their ethnicity in their daily life. As mentioned before, there are little 
contacts in Tabriz with people from other ethnicities since the city is a homogeneous 
Azeri. Many interviewees declared that they do not feel a big tangible economic or 
political discrimination against Azeris in Iran; however, the ethnic activist groups are 
rapidly increasing in the city. To find out the reasons behind it, I investigated in the daily 
interactions of Tabrizi youths. The findings demonstrate that the indigeneity is an 
important issue for them. Although indigeneity, at first glance, seems to be a general 
global issue everywhere and not directly related to the ethnic identity, the fieldwork 
revealed that the place of origin of the person could be the main drive for  him in joining 
ethnic civil or radical movements.  
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After discussing about the dilemma of indigeneity in Tabriz, we will move to the 
importance of ethnic language in Tabrizi youth’s everyday lives. Accent variation, as the 
main source of social stigma for the suborders, is discussed later. Having non-Tabrizi 
accent, they cannot well-assimilate in the city and in result are potential to join radical 
ethnic movements. Chehelmetri neighborhood has been presented as an example of the 
result of such dissimulation. 
 
5.2.1. The dilemma of indigeneity in Tabriz 
Historically and politically speaking, Tabriz city has always been the most 
important city for Iranian Azerbaijanis. The role of the city in Iranian constitutional 
revolution (1905 – 1911) and later in the Islamic revolution of Iran is significant 
(Abrahamian, 1982). This role has been carried out by the influential Tabrizi individuals 
and social and political groups, together with the active contribution of the middle and 
upper-middle class families of the city. This historical image has shaped the Tabrizi 
Identity as indigenous and Tabrizi accent as the most prestigious among Iranian 
Azerbaijanis. However, we rarely see a similar situation in case of other big Azeri cities 
such as Ardabil or Zanjan. Here, instead of defining the concept of indigeneity in its 
nature, which proved to be controversial, we intend to look at the everyday life of Tabrizis 
people to see how they perceive and practice it in real life. The term “indigenous Tabrizi” 
came up during the discussion in almost all interviews I conducted and many daily 
interactions I had in the field. Here, different categories for being recognized as an 
indigenous Tabrizi, and the perception of not-Tabrizis towards them are presented. 
Many people believe that to be an indigenous Tabrizi; one should have his/her 
origin in Tabriz for centuries. At the same time, they would say that it is almost impossible 
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to find such people in Tabriz today. This is how “Khalil,” one of my interviewees, who 
claim to be an indigenous Tabrizi, puts his understanding of Tabrizi indigeneity into 
words: 
“Today, one can hardly find an indigenous Tabrizi in Tabriz; they have 
all migrated to Tehran or the overseas. Many of the current residents are the 
rural migrants who came and occupied the city… some of them have ruined 
the indigenous Tabrizi culture. They are the majority in Tabriz now … 
everywhere, in Bazar, administration offices … they have washed away all 
the authentic Tabrizi culture.” 
 
However, talking about the second generation of migrants to Tabriz, “accents” 
play a more important role. The youth who have been born and brought up in Tabriz or 
others who had migrated to the city since their childhood usually could speak with Tabrizi 
accent. Especially if one of their parents speaks with Tabrizi accent, it would be easier 
for them to consider themselves as a Tabrizi origin. This way, they can adhere to Tabrizi 
identity as the most prestigious one among Iranian Azerbaijanis. “Masoumeh” explains 
about her experience as follow: 
“My family migrated to Tabriz when I was only 2 years old. So I was 
brought up in Tabriz and learned to speak with Tabrizi accent. However, 
when I talk to my parents at home, I have the rural accent, but I can easily 
switch to Tabrizi accent in my daily life and social interactions outside of 
home and never get confused. I have kind of got used to it.” 
 
In response to another question about the indigeneity, she defines herself as 
Tabrizi since she speaks with the same accent of indigenous Tabrizis. However, in some 
other social occasions when she does not know how to behave as a Tabrizi in some rituals 
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like marriage or funeral ceremonies, she needs to get the information from her 
acquaintance who has migrated to Tabriz before her family. 
Some other individuals who neither were born in Tabriz nor speak with Tabrizi 
accent belong to the group that believes living in Tabriz for certain years is enough to 
make you an indigenous resident. For instance, Saeed explains his originality as follows: 
“I was born in Ardabil, raised in Tehran, but since my teenage-hood, I 
have lived in Tabriz. I speak Persian with my parents and siblings at home 
while my mom and dad speak in Azerbaijani together. When we migrated to 
Tabriz, I had used to talk in Persian with my friends. After entering the 
university, I felt that I should be a supporter of Azerbaijani ethnic rights. So 
I started to speak in Azerbaijani in public. Even though Tabrizis do not 
accept me as one of themselves, I strongly define myself as Tabrizi.” 
 
He complained about Tabrizi accent being a big deal for the arrogant indigenous 
Tabrizis. Another interviewee, Kiyanoush, who was born from a Persian mother and 
Tabrizi father, but speaks Azeri with Persian accent, complains about his situation:  
“For me, who does not speak with their accent, it is impossible to expand 
my social network in Tabriz. My carrier demands trust and social relations. 
But they don’t let me inside their circle even though I am an indigenous 
Tabrizi“. 
 
The importance of indigeneity in Tabriz is shown in everyday life. People judge 
the others based on their accent more than any other criteria. Tabrizi accent, as the basic 
component of the symbolic capital for the one who speaks it, brings the feeling of 
stigmatization to the others immigrants who don’t. In the case when the immigrants 
belong to the middle class, they could live in the city center interacting with the other so-
called indigenous Tabrizis; otherwise, when they are poor migrants and live in the suburb 
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areas the situation is far different. In some cases, like Chehelmetri neighborhood, this 
dissimilation results in showing rebellious actions, which will be discussed in details later. 
 
5.2.2. The role of accent variation in in-group assimilation 
In the lack of perceived economic discrimination against Azeris in Iran, the 
youths’ deal with the stigma of the language itself or their accent rather than other forms 
of discrimination. This perceived linguistic stigma is not only rooted in being mocked by 
other ethnic groups but also is rooted in Azeris self-view of their language.  
Like in any other part of the world, the accent is playing an important role in 
shaping the initial judgment about a person in Tabriz city. Here, we are going to explain 
about different categories of the Azerbaijani youth in Tabriz and their differences, which 
could be identified by their accent: 
The first group is Tabrizis who have been born in Tabriz, and either one or both 
of their parents have Tabrizi accent. In such cases, children usually take Tabrizi accent 
and even sometimes, after they grow up, they start to criticize the non-Tabrizi accent of 
their parents.  
Another category consisted of the youth who have been born in or migrated to 
Tabriz in their early childhood. Here depending on the neighborhood they live in and the 
social environment of school they go to, children would take either Tabrizi or their 
parent’s accent. In the case of the poor neighborhoods where only migrants from certain 
villages reside, children would usually take their parent’s accent. In the mixed 
neighborhoods in downtown where domination is with Tabrizis, usually, children would 
take the dominant accent of the city.  
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Interviewee “Sahar”, who was born in Khoy, but brought up in a middle-class 
neighborhood in Tabriz, speaks fluently with Tabrizi accent. She says that: 
“Certain words are different in Khoy’s and Tabriz’s accent. Therefore 
talking at home with my parent’s, I usually follow the Khoy’s accent, but in 
public, I always talk in Tabriz’s accent because otherwise Tabrizi’s would 
mock my accent … I never get confused in alternating between accents. It is 
something that I got used to it since my childhood …” 
 
Other group consists of the youth who have been migrated to Tabriz as a teenage 
or others who live in Tabriz as students or job holders. For them, there is no way to escape 
the perceived sense of stigmatization of being considered rural in Tabriz. Many of them 
who I interviewed with, were very unsatisfied with how Tabrizis treat them as rural 
people. “Mohammad” talked about how tough it has been for him to deal with the people 
who look down at him every day. That despite having a good job and financial status, in 
many social interactions, he might get affected because of his accent.  
The situation for females is even worse. In order to overcome the stigma of being 
rural, the common strategy for them is to conceal their origin. I faced several female 
students who would normally prefer to speak in Persian rather than with their local 
Azerbaijani accent. In situations that they could conceal their origin, many prefer to talk 
in Persian in order to enjoy the high social status of being Persian among Tabrizis. Many 
of them refused to have an interview about their motivations of speaking in Persian 
instead of their mother tongue. Through informal conversations I had with some of them, 
I realized that they try to justify themselves in different ways. One of them claimed that 
she is more comfortable with Persian because she has spent her childhood in a Persian-
speaking city. For another one, her mother being Persian was the reason not to speak 
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Azeri despite living all her life in an Azeri city.  However, it was difficult to investigate 
whether these claims worked for them as a defense mechanism to overcome the stigma 
they faced with every day, or it was the reality of their lives. 
Many of the first and second generations of migrants are unsatisfied with how 
they are judged in their daily lives in Tabriz. Their reactions to this phenomena vary from 
the identity concealment to becoming an ethnic activist. But for those who speak the 
language with a dominant accent, the only occasion in which they might feel embarrassed 
and judged as “dumb” is when they travel to dominant Persian cities which do not happen 
on a daily basis. This might be the main reason behind the fact that Tabrizi youth are less 
unsatisfied with the ethnic policies of the government than non-Tabrizi Azeri residents of 
the city. 
 
5.2.3. Ethnic rights activism in Tabriz 
It is an unquestionable fact that ethnic activists play the most important role in 
shifting the ethnic boundaries. Today in Iran, the commonly used word to refer activist 
groups is “identity seekers” (Hovey at tab in Persian). Their demands vary from basic 
political or educational rights to seeking for the independence from Iran. Although the 
main question of this research is not centered on the categorization of ethnic activist 
groups, understanding the reasons behind shaping and increasing the influence of these 
groups help us to understand the dynamics of boundary making among Tabrizi youths.  
In recent years, there is an increasing trend in promoting ethnic rights, especially 
the right for having education in mother language among Tabrizis. While the number of 
middle-class families who prefer to speak with their children in Persian is shrinking in 
Tabriz, the preference of the Persian to Azeri is still common in the other Azeri dominant 
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cities. There is much literature about the rise of these rights; however, little research has 
been done to investigate who is more potential to join civic or radical movements. 
Borrowing the concept of “social field constraints” from Wimmer (2008), this section 
argues that the distinct field characteristics of different Tabrizi youths constrain their 
freedom to choose whether to be a radical, civil or non-activist.  
The first topic discussed in this section was about the importance of being from 
Tabriz which specifically defined as having Tabrizi accent among the folk. I found very 
few educated middle-class Tabrizi youths, who were eager to join the identity-seeking 
groups. It seems that the indigeneity and symbolic capital it brings to its holder, have little 
place in encouraging individuals to be ethnic activists. Many of these Tabrizi accent 
speaking youths express their hatred of the activist groups in general and the radical 
secessionist groups in particular, by calling them as pan-Turk groups and a threat to the 
territorial integrity of Iran. They think that these groups are recessive and lacking the 
modern thoughts. 
On the other hand, among the young migrants, especially in the poor 
neighborhoods of the city, activism and radical movements are significantly popular. 
Many of them have never traveled to Persian-speaking cities to be stigmatized in direct 
contact, yet they claim to be discriminated in all aspects of their social life. Though they 
are minorities, their voices are being projected in the media much more than the other 
youth who share the majority. Social media spreads a picture of an individual holding an 
independent Southern Azerbaijan flag in Tabriz very fast. Such movements are gradually 
changing the picture of Azerbaijanis in the eyes of other ethnic groups which results in 
shifting ethnic boundaries. 
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To investigate the roots and reasons behind this emerging youth movement, 
Chelehmetri neighborhood, as a well-known center for these movements is being 
discussed in the next section. 
 
5.2.4. Chehelmetri neighborhood and its role in changing ethnic boundaries 
Located in the northwestern residential area of the city, Chehelmetri, Hyderabad, 
Rezvanshahr and Khalilabad neighborhoods have been studied in this research. Through 
interviewing experts and not-experts1, I realized that these neighborhoods are known for 
ethnic activism in Tabriz city.  Even Though there are differences in the economic status 
of the residents of each of these neighborhoods, we have neglected these differences since 
culturally the youth in these regions share very similar culture and have close contacts 
with each other.  
The area was consisted of remote drylands or in some parts agricultural lands. The 
land owners sold them at low prices to the thousands of newly arrived job seeker migrants 
in Tabriz in the late 1970s. Initially, almost all houses were built illegally, but later many 
of the owners applied for the documentation authorized by the city municipality. 
However, many houses and shops still do not have authorized documentation and trading 
these properties without the municipality control is still practiced. 
Historically, Chehelmetri and nearby neighborhoods have been constructed by 
poor migrants from Northern parts of the East Azerbaijan Province. The neighborhood is 
homogeneous to a high degree compared to the other parts of Tabriz city. Origins of the 
residents vary from the cities and villages close to the border of Iran and the Republic of 
                                                 
1 The information of the interviewees who reside in these neighborhood have been 
listed In Appendix 1. 
63 
 
Azerbaijan to the nearby cities located in the northern parts of Tabriz such as Qaradagh 
or Arasbaran. The main parts of the Qaradagh area are Ahar, Kaleybar, and Varzgan. 
Depending on the street they live in, the residents have migrated to Tabriz from the 1970s 
until the very recent years. For some of them, the third generation of the migrants has 
been already born in Tabriz city. Despite all the variations, they have many cultural 
similarities due to strong neighborhood ties and relations between them.  
Since many of the residents work in carpet weaving industry or hold other local 
jobs which require little contact with the other neighborhoods of the city, their cultural 
interactions are usually limited to the people in downtown. Except for a few educated 
young people who would meet their future spouses in university and marry someone from 
other neighborhoods, others would whether marry someone from their own village or its 
neighborhood. Therefore, the way they conduct their rituals and ceremonies is usually 
more influenced by the rural rather than Tabrizi culture.  This way, in this relatively 
isolated part of the city, the rural culture even among the second or third generations of 
the migrants, tends to be reproduced.  
Qaradagh region is famous for its rich traditional folklore in Azerbaijan. Many 
traditional Azerbaijani musicians called “Ashiq” are from this area. While in other parts 
of Iranian Azerbaijan, The tradition of musical performance at marriage ceremonies has 
been fading, in Qaradagh region still they still exist as an important part of the ceremony.  
Geographical proximity to the Republic of Azerbaijan and witnessing the 
separation of Azerbaijan to two parts influenced their folklore a lot. Many poems have 
been written about separation of family members after the Turkmenchay treaty. Some 
historical ethnic hero’s play a powerful symbolic role in making them be more conscious 
about ethnic separation and ethnic rights.  
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People of Qaradagh, as all ethnic groups of the world, have or create many things 
as a symbol to be proud of. “Babak,” a historical figure who is a symbolic hero of 
Azerbaijanis who stands against Arabs invasion, has his castle in Qaradagh. For many 
years, Azerbaijani ethnic activists attend a symbolic ceremony of Babak’s birthday in the 
Castle located near Kaleybar city. These annual events increased their senses of proudness 
to their origin. “Sattarkhan,” as the national hero of the constitutional revolution in Iran 
is an example of the proud of Qaradaghi origin people. 
However, the dominant view in Tabriz towards Qaradaghis is looking down at 
them, considering them as a nomadic and uncultured people. Many of non-Qaradaghi 
origin interviewees of this research expressed that they would judge people from that 
area, at least, as newly arrived migrants who should learn how to live in the city if not 
considered them as dumb. At the same time when I was asking Qaradaghis that how other 
Tabrizis would judge them, some like Naser said that: “They respect us, they afraid of us 
… They know we are brave and great people …” 
As a migrant from Qaradagh to Tabriz, one should deal with the stigma of their 
origin in their daily life. Although many of them were migrated to Tabriz long time ago, 
still one could see that they did not assimilate in the city’s dominant culture. Being 
neglected in the city because of having the stigma of their origin and having proud of who 
they are and what their ancestors did for Azerbaijan are two paradoxical sentiments that 
they deal with it in their everyday life. 
Today, various cultural and economic barriers made certain obstacles in the way 
of assimilation with the city culture for the young generation. Since they have so called 
rural accent, it is difficult for them to get accepted in other Tabrizi youth circles. While 
nowadays dominant middle-class youth living in different parts of metropolitan Tabriz 
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choose their friend's circles regardless of their neighborhood, the youth in Chehelmetri 
have strong social cohesion with their friends living nearby. This strong cohesion among 
them might be a natural resistance against being ignored by other middle-class youths in 
the city.  
The Tabriz-based Tractor-Sazi football club which turned to be the main gathering 
place for many ethnic activists plays a vital role for them to show their ethnic based 
demand. Whenever Tractor-size hosted a match in Tabriz, many youths gather in the main 
square of Chehelmetri and filling into the buses to attend the match. During the play, 
many of them shouting politically-flavored slogans ranging from moderate demands to 
establishing school teaching in Azerbaijani, to emphasize on their distinct ethnicity.  
Although many thousands of supporters from all over Azerbaijan come to Tabriz 
to support the team, most of the Tabrizi interviewees in this research emphasized that the 
radical slangs are from the Chehelmetri supporters and others who come from the rural 
areas. Most of the uneducated interviewees from Chehelmetri emphasized that usually, 
they do not care what they are shouting during the match. They only follow what the 
leader says. When I joined to some matches with my interviewees, I witnessed that they 
are repeating some radical slogans as a chant. However, usually during the interviews, 
they refused to accept. 
Many youths who are following the few educated ones engage in several ethnic 
activities which are going on in the neighborhood. As a stranger and outsider, they rarely 
let me participate in their gatherings and meetings. Even participant observation in their 
neighborhood for about two months brought many questions to them about my affiliation 
and any potential political use of such anthropological researches. It is very common 
among them to become an Azerbaijani poet. Almost in all interviews and daily talks they 
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used several poems to describe their feelings or beliefs. Poets usually use different Azeri 
pen names and prefer to be called by their pen names. They also use the term “müəllim” 
(means teacher in Azerbaijani) to call the educated ones to respect them in the common 
way of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Such naming and gathering are not common in other 
neighborhoods of the city. Many of these uneducated youth are well aware of the 
Azerbaijan and Armenia conflict and were eager to participate in the possible future war. 
At the same time, during the interviews, they were showing respect to the territorial 
integrity of Iran. It is difficult to judge if this respect was because of the fear of possible 
consequences of a recorded interview or their real belief.  
 
 5.2.5. Discussion 
In this section, intra-ethnic interactions among the youth in Tabriz city will be 
discussed by combining the findings and theories. First, the role of non-Tabrizi accent in 
stigmatizing migrants will be analyzed using the SNAC model. Then the social and 
cultural features of Chehelmetri neighborhood will be taken into consideration using 
Wimmer’s (2013) model of ethnic boundary making.  
1- As it reviewed in the theoretical framework, social stigma comes into existence 
when the dominant culture stereotypes and negatively labels undesirable differences. It is 
when people experience discrimination and status loss, which may harm their access to 
power and cause other consequences. Being a speaker of a non-native language or having 
a non-standard accent can affect social status of the speaker, as we saw in two cases 
discussed: non-Tabrizi Azeris facing Tabrizi people, and Azeri people facing Persians 
(Farsi speakings). The complexity of these interactions could be shown using The Model 
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of Stigma of Non-native Accents in Communication (SNAC) from the both sides of the 
speaker and listener (see Figure 2).  
From the listener’s point of view, Tabrizi people look down at the others who 
possess non-Tabrizi accent by labeling them as non-indigenous, rural and uneducated. 
Some instances for such presumptions are: not letting them in their social circles, not 
willing to marry them or to see their accent as a “bad credit” when making their decision. 
On the other hand, Persian speakers look down at Azeris as a whole labeling them as 
dumb (promoting through Azeri ethnic jokes) and “Shahrestani” (town dweller). 
On the other hand, from the speaker’s point of view, in the case of the non-Tabrizi 
Azeries when facing Tabrizi their communicational challenge is how to communicate 
without revealing their rural background. While in a broader sense, when Azeries face 
Persians, they concern about how to speak Persian without making grammatical or word-
choice mistakes to prevent being judged or mocked. 
For non-Tabrizis, having a fear of being judged by others who speak in Tabrizi 
accent, their communication strategy is usually to hide their rural accents by speaking 
Persian (among the females) or to avoid making friendship with Tabrizis (among the 
males). In another occasion, when Azeris, in general, face Persians some of their 
communication strategies would be avoiding communication, hiding their Azeri accent, 
or trying to justify their accent by talking about it are some of the. 
These communication strategies will lead them to shape their future interactions 
strategy gradually. In this sense, some non-Tabrizi migrants from specific neighborhoods 
might try to achieve symbolic capital by being recognized as an activist. Other Tabrizi 
middle-class youths who face the stigma of having accent insist on Azeri’s linguistic 
rights while keeping a distance from radical identity seekers. 
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Taking any of these strategies varies depending on communicative factors (how 
successful speakers are in hiding their accents) and contextual factors (the situation in 
which the conversation happens, how educated or high-ranked the speaker is, what is the 
goal of conversation).  
While only accent variation cannot describe the rapidly increasing radical 
movements in Chehelmetri neighborhood, we will try to implement Wimmer’s analytical 
framework in the next section.  
 
2- Some scholars like “Sajad” believe that no middle and upper middle-class 
Tabrizi would join to the current ethnic activist groups for some reasons. First, historically 
they know the strong ties between Iran and Azerbaijan. Second, there is no convincing 
ideology behind such radical ethnic demands in the 21st century when ethnic boundaries 
are blurring.  
Accepting these presumptions, interviews, and observations of this research 
showed some other results as well. Mainly the youth from the middle and upper middle-
class families believe that being an ethnic activist is not a political act which could enter 
their circle. The reason might be lied in keeping a distance from the main advocates of 
these movements who are the poor and lower classes. Instead, some of them would 
actively engage in other civil movements of Iranian society, if they happen to be eager to 
participate in any.  
Many others choose the strategy of boundary blurring arguing that talking about 
secessionism in the 21st century is not a modern move. By having these thoughts in mind, 
while many have a Primordial view to Iranian national identity, they want to distinct 
themselves from the rural or unassimilated generation of immigrants.  
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On the other hand, In Chehelmetri neighborhood, all of the youth participants 
declared that the main roots of bold ethnic activism in their region is economic 
deprivation which they suffer in comparison with other parts of the city. Many scholars 
put the main emphasis on that as well. However, one might argue that why the same 
phenomenon does not exist in other suburb parts of the city. Although Chehelmetri, 
Hyderabad, and Rezvanshahr neighborhoods are considered as a suburb poor regions, 
they are not slammed neighborhoods. Many youths work and earn enough money to 
handle their daily life and inexpensive entertainments.  
This research, propose that the main motivation behind political activities among 
the youth in these neighborhoods lies in being stigmatized by other residents of the city 
in daily contacts. For instance “Saber” says that they live in a part of the city where is like 
a refugee camp. No one from else would visit their region and would be eager to talk to 
them. Lack of social interactions causes their local culture to get reproduced among new 
generations. This social closure increases their level of Groupness and social cohesion. 
They are affected by the consequences of nation-state building process in Iran much less 
than the middle-class families. At the same time, their strong support of ethnic rights 
movements, which in some cases even brought severe consequences of being arrested by 
Police, made their neighborhood as one of the politically important areas of the city. For 
many interviewees, this political salience was a sign of proud and honor. 
As explained before, Wimmer (2008) discussed how boundary features of ethnic 
groups affect their historical stability. He argues that high level of cultural differentiation, 
social closure, and political salience would cause a historical instability to an ethnic 
group. This point of view is applicable to the Chehelmetri youth. Since they have 
experienced high degrees of all mentioned features, their group historical stability is 
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extremely low. While their parents usually do not care about the ethnic activism, the youth 
changed this dominant non-political sphere to the very political one. 
As it mentioned in the methodology part, the participant observation and 
interviews were done for this part are only projecting the male voices. Cultural barriers 
of being a young male researcher made it impossible to bring a whole picture from the 
phenomenon by taking both genders into consideration. Regarding the validity of 
findings, even though I tried my best to use some links to make the interviewees feel 
relieved that this research is only for the academic sake, it is difficult to judge that to what 
extent they concealed the reality. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
In order to understand the nature, degree of importance and popularity of the 
emerging ethnic movements among the Iranian Azerbaijanis, scholars have taken 
different perspectives; from approaching the issue as an inevitable and natural 
consequence of deprivation of Iranian Azerbaijanis from their basic ethnic rights to a 
mere result of external political penetration.  
However, a critical review of the literature would reveal the existence of several 
gaps in the majority of these researches. For one thing, many of such researches fall short 
in providing sociological insights and reliable ethnographic evidence for what they claim. 
In fact, political and historical perspectives dominate the literature. Moreover, the 
majority of them approach “Iranian Azeris” as a homogenous group having similar 
demands and same strategies to achieve these demands, which appear to be non-accurate 
in different dimensions such as generation gap, city, geographical location, etc. 
This thesis is an attempt to first, prove the vital importance of having a micro-
sociological approach by presenting the existing variations and heterogeneity among 
different groups. Second, it aims to take a small step in understanding ethnic identity 
construction process among Tabrizi youths, which in turn can contribute to understanding 
the nature, root causes, and body of ethnic movements in this city. Yet the main distinction 
of this thesis from the previous works may lie in its focus on how everyday micro level 
“interactions” of actors “construct” their identity and distinguish them from “others.”  
For doing so, this research has taken a qualitative approach which benefits 
ethnographic fieldwork, participant observation and in-depth interview as its main tools. 
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The questions aim to investigate the ethnic boundary features and the self-perception of 
identity among Tabrizi youths.  
The ethnographic findings of this research demonstrates that social stigma of the 
language and accent plays a more important role in Iranian Azeris dissatisfaction and 
resentment toward the current situation than perceived political or economic 
discrimination by the government. Nevertheless, different groups of Iranian Azerbaijanis 
do not experience the linguistic and accent-based stigmatization in the same way.  
In the dominant Azeri city of Tabriz, Tabrizi culture, accent and customs are 
considered as “standard” and “indigenous.” Therefore, a middle-class Tabrizi who speaks 
with Tabrizi accent usually has a satisfactory amount of symbolic capital living in Tabriz. 
Therefore, he is not much attracted to other identity alternatives of Persian or Fars’, or 
that of affinity with Republic of Azerbaijan or Turkey. In other words, in instrumentalist 
terms, they choose to enjoy their indigenous Tabrizi identity over Turkish affinity with 
people in Turkey, as the two identities are culturally and linguistically distinct; They chose 
the Tabrizi identity over the Azerbaijani identity of the people in the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, as they see Azerbaijan as economically and culturally undeveloped compared 
to Iran despite the linguistic similarities. Finally, they choose the Tabrizi identity over 
Persian or Fars identity as they don’t have to deal with this “other” on a daily basis to 
suffer from social linguistic and accent-based stigmatization. Moreover, no widespread 
belief of being economically or politically discriminated by Persians exists among the 
majority of Tabrizi youths. As Wimmer (2008) argues, they usually choose the blurring 
strategy of ethnic boundary making by expressing that the ethnicity is not an important 
issue in the 21st century. We might argue that being proud of being “Tabrizi” could 
compensate for the perceived stigma of being a “dumb Turk” in Iran. They already enjoy 
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speaking with a dominant accent, and this meets their need for the needed social 
distinction.  In the case of some individuals who are concerned about their ethnic and 
linguistic rights, they prefer not to join activist groups to preserve their distinction from 
people with perceived ‘low-culture.' They do not want to be in the same category with 
rural and migrants of the poor neighborhoods. 
Non-Tabrizi Azeri residents of Tabriz city, on the other hand, find themselves in a 
more complicated situation.  While many of them had few contacts with Persians in their 
lifetime, their demands and dissatisfaction target Persians and the central government. We 
would argue that the main roots of such ethnic unrests can be traced in being discriminated 
inside Tabriz city by speakers of Tabrizi accent, and not Persians. They have been affected 
much less than others have by the institutional language of the country. However, their 
voices are louder than anyone else is in the city.  
The findings of this research demonstrate how the process of nation-building 
which  “constructed” a strong Iranian identity in the 19th and 20th centuries,  has started 
to get threatened by other emerging discourses including the discourses of “rights” and 
the “ethnic identity” nationwide.  The discourse of rights directly or indirectly has shaped 
the main body of criticisms against the discourse of Iranian national identity by bringing 
up discussions concerning ethnic and linguistic rights of ethnic minorities in Iran. 
However, by taking a closer look, it seems that this emerging movement has been 
distancing itself from its origin and becoming as exclusive as its opponent was. If Reza 
Shah unified the country by suppressing ethnic minorities and imposing the “Iranian 
identity” and “Persian Language” as the only legitimate identity for all Iranians, today 
some ethnic activists are known as “identity seekers” are not merely looking for their 
basic and legitimate rights, but have gone to the other extreme end by exaggerating the 
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role language and folklore play in defining distinct groups as a “whole”.  The 
ethnographic research confirms the hypothesis that the radical “identity seekers” do not 
represent the majority of Tabrizi people. This is especially important due to all the 
possible political and administrative consequences that such a perception can cause. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, high levels of cultural difference and social closure 
together with the increased political salience of certain neighborhoods of the city result 
in empowering the social field constraints among the residents.  
Increased political salience, cultural differences, and groupness among the youth 
in certain neighborhoods of Tabriz city, caused by their historical instability.  The youth 
in Chehelmetri, compared to the others in downtown have more potential to join radical 
groups. This situation is applicable to the migrants and students who are originally from 
small cities but are now living in Tabriz for a couple of years. Therefore, seeing the 
majority of the Tabrizi youth as radical and secessionist not only blurs the reality but also 
can be used as an excuse for the Iranian government to suppress all the basic ethnic right 
demands of the Azeri people.  
Moreover, the newly evolving civil movement inspired by the “universal” 
discourse of human rights, and the critical analysis of the nation building process and 
Iranian identity is itself in danger of becoming a “local” exclusive movement. The 
important question here is what is this “identity” that the “identity seekers” are looking 
for? Who needs it? And how they are benefiting from it? Therefore, the different 
tendencies among the different groups of ethnic activists should be recognized, 
distinguished from one another, and critically analyzed. 
In conducting the fieldwork of this thesis, I came across many difficulties. The 
political sensitivity of the issue made it difficult to reach fully random interviewees. Since 
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many ethnic gathering’s activists are held secretly and in underground, they rejected to 
allow me participating in any of their serious meetings. Moreover, although I tried my 
best to choose my respondents from diverse social classes (see Appendix 1), still there is 
a fear that the work cannot be representative of the entire Tabriz city. The other main 
shortcoming of the research is an unintentional undermining of the female voices. While 
it was not that difficult to find the female interviewees among middle-class Tabrizis, I 
only had the change of interviewing one female in the Chehelmetri neighborhood. Thus 
my data in that part of the city, could only represent half of the youths’ population. This 
limitation also applies to my ethnography. It is recommended for the future researchers 
to train an opposite sex assistant to have a holistic picture of the studied population. 
In conclusion, my recommendation to the policy makers in order to control the 
rapid diffusion of the radical tendencies among ethnic Azeries would be putting their 
efforts to decrease poverty and marginality in the suburb poor areas of Tabriz city. 
Moreover, building some public facilities and administrative offices in neighborhoods 
such as Chehelmetri would increase their daily contact with other citizens and decrease 
the sense of being discriminated, ignored and marginalized.   
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: The youth interviewees’ profile 
No. Name Age/Sex Accent Occupation Comments 
1 Reza 23/M Tabriz University Student Former ethnic activist 
2 Saeed 31/M Ardabil Carpenter 
Born in Ardabil, early life in Tehran and 
Ardabil, Lives in Tabriz for 20 years, 
strong belief in his Tabrizi identity 
3 Arzu 25/F Tabriz University Student 
Some family members live in Turkey - 
Regular travels to Turkey 
4 Maryam 35/F Tabriz House wife 
Married to a Kurdish dentist, many times 
traveled to Turkey 
5 Kiyanush 31/M Persian  
Computer 
technician 
Lives in Rasht since 6 years ago 
6 Nazli 27/M Urban University Student 
Many travels to Turkey and once to 
Baku 
7 Ali 33/M Tabriz Silver industry Doing business between Iran and Turkey 
8 Hassan 33/M Tabriz Exchange shop 
Many travels to Turkey and once to 
Baku 
9 Masoume 22/F Tabriz University Student  
10 Majid 35/M Marand Businessman Commuter between Iran and Turkey 
11 Hossein 27/M Varzgan Worker Resides in Chehelmetri neighborhood 
12 Masoud 26/M Tabriz self-employed  
13 Sepehr 21/M Meshgin 
University 
Student, activist 
Lived in Tabriz for 5 years 
 
14 Alireza 21/M Urumiyeh 
University Student 
- Ethnic activist 
Lived in Tabriz for 3 years 
15 Elnaz 33/M Tabriz self-employed Talking in Persian at home 
16 Neda 26/F Tabriz University Student Talking in Persian at home 
81 
 
No. Name Age/Sex Accent Occupation Comments 
17 Yeganeh 35/M Baku House wife 
Came to Tabriz from Baku after 
marriage 
18 Armin 29/M Tabriz University Student  
19 Ahmad 28/M Ahar Clerk  
20 Nazanin 24/F Tabriz House wife  
21 Mohammad 21/M Bilasuvar 
University Student 
- Ethnic activist 
Lived in Tabriz for 5 years, From the 
Iran -Azerbaijan border area 
22 Habib 27/M Ardabil 
University 
Student, ethnic 
activist 
Former political prisoner, Lived in 
Tabriz for 3 years, Working in Tehran on 
vacations, 
23 Polat 35/M Tabriz Architect 
Studied in Baku for 5 years, lived in 
Tabriz for 5 years 
24 Sarah 33/F Persian Architect 
Denying to be Azeri origin and knowing 
language, Studied in Baku for 5 years, 
lived in Tabriz for 5 years 
25 Yunes 31/M Ardabi Shop keeper 
Former political prisoner, studied in 
Tabriz for 4 years and married with 
Tabrizi girl 
27 Saber 23/M Varzgan 
Carpet weaver, 
poet 
Born and lived in Tabriz, Resides in 
Chehelmetri neighborhood 
28 Araz 24/M Kaleybar 
Carpet weaver, 
Ethnic activist, 
Translator 
Born and lived in Tabriz, Resides in 
Chehelmetri neighborhood 
29 Adel 28/M Kaleybar Factory worker 
Born and lived in Tabriz, Resides in 
Chehelmetri neighborhood 
30 Behzad 20/M Mugan Elevator repairing 
Born and lived in Tabriz, Resides in 
Chehelmetri neighborhood 
31 Safa 24/M Kaleybar Worker 
Born and lived in Tabriz, Resides in 
Chehelmetri neighborhood 
32 Behnam 30/M Tabriz Shoes maker  
33 Sahar 21/F Tabriz University Student  
34 Saeed 21/M Germi University Student Lived in Tabriz for 3 years 
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No. Name Age/Sex Accent Occupation Comments 
35 Khalil 34/M Tabriz Shop keeper  
36 Rasul 31/M Tabriz Tailor  
37 Hossein 20/M Ahar Worker 
Born and lived in Tabriz, Resides in 
Chehelmetri neighborhood 
38 Babak 21/M Ahar Car mechanic 
Born and lived in Tabriz, Resides in 
Chehelmetri neighborhood 
39 Romic 30/M Armenian Musician Armenian 
40 Sana 23/F Tabriz University Student  
41 Nima 28/M Tabriz Optician  
42 Jalil 34/M Tabriz Mechanic  
43 Kazem 35/M 
Persian 
Accent 
Mechanic 
Born and lived in Tehran for 30 years, 
lived 5 years in Tabriz 
44 Shahram 28/M Tabriz Worker  
45 Mortaza 20/M Tabriz University Student Belongs to Ahle-Hagh religious minority 
46 Sevada 28/F Tabriz  
Lived in Istanbul for 2 years and in 
Tehran for 3 years 
47 Yashar 35/M Tabriz Musician 
Belongs to religious minority of Ahle-
Hagh 
48 Bahman 35/M Baku Clerk 
Interviewed in Baku, ethnic activist, 
political refugee in Azerbaijan 
49 Abolfazl 33/M Baku Engineer Interviewed in Baku, ethnic activist 
50 Karim 33/M Tabriz Optician Belongs to Bahayi religious minority 
51 Mohsen 28/M Tabriz Medical Doctor  
52 Zahra 30/F Kaleybar 
Journalist, writter, 
ethnic activist 
Born and lived in Tabriz, Resides in 
Chehelmetri neighborhood 
53 Heshmat 35/M Ahar Lawyer  
54 Naser 29/M Kaleybar University Student 
Born and lived in Tabriz, Resides in 
Chehelmetri neighborhood 
83 
 
No. Name Age/Sex Accent Occupation Comments 
55 Mehdi 25/M Kaleybar University Student 
Born and lived in Tabriz, Resides in 
Chehelmetri neighborhood 
56 Akbar 21/M Varzgan 
University 
Student, Azeri 
musician 
Born and lived in Tabriz, Resides in 
Chehelmetri neighborhood 
58 Abazar 25/M Kaleybar 
Low rank police 
officer 
Born and lived in Tabriz, Resides in 
Chehelmetri neighborhood 
59 Babak 32/M Tabriz 
Engineer, ethnic 
activist 
Editor of an Azerbaijani journal 
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Appendix 2. The expert interviewees’ profile 
 
No. Name Age/Sex Accent Comments 
1 Iman 59/M Poet, writer and Journalist 
In close contact with the Azeri 
scholars and linguistics in the 
Republic of Azerbaijan, Lived in 
Tabriz for 40 years 
2 Taghi 59/M Painter, Ethnic activist 
Having strong secessionist and pan-
Turkish ideologies 
3 Mehman 65/M University lecturer 
Interviewed in Baku, politician, 
historian, 
4 Shokat 42/F University lecturer Interviewed in Baku, anthropologist 
5 Sajad 63/M University lecturer Azerbaijani books writer 
6 Rahim 67/M 
University lecturer, ethnic 
activist and writter 
Interviewed in Tehran, studied and 
lived in Turkey for several years, 
Lives in Tehran 
7 Amin 40/M Religious Teacher 
In close contact with the youth in 
Tabriz 
8 Masoud 36/M University lecturer 
Born in Zanjan, lived in Tabriz for 4 
years 
9 Elham 40/F University lecturer Usually talks in Persian 
10 Leila 58/F University lecturer Azerbaijani cultural activist 
11 Mahmood 65/M Self-employed 
leftist and ethnic activist, In close 
contact with scholars in Baku, 
former political prisoner 
12 Nabi 60/M Book shop owner 
cultural activist and Former political 
prisoner  
13 Seyed Ali 63/M Self-employed Political and ethnic activist 
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No. Name Age/Sex Accent Comments 
14 Sadegh 60/M High school teacher Writer in Azerbaijani language 
15 Asghar 39/M Journalist, writer, ethnic 
activist 
Interviewed in Tehran 
